Author: Su Xiaokang
Today, the heightened enthusiasm of Chinese nationalism is world-renowned; Compared to over a hundred years ago, the suspicion, wariness, and hostility that had arisen from being bullied by Western powers have not diminished in the slightest. However, today China faces a series of ethnic issues, especially those concerning Tibet and Xinjiang, which has given rise to another excitement: compared to the weak Han in border areas and ethnic minorities, China harbors strong Han-centrism ideology. How can this contradiction be explained?
1. Cultural racism
Culturally, the Confucian-centered Chinese tradition established the concept of the “debate between barbarians and Chinese” very early on. The long-standing Central Plains have always held a sense of superiority over ‘inner China, outer barbarians,’ a legacy that has persisted for four thousand years, and can be considered a form of cultural racism. Broadly speaking, this kind of racism is neither expansionistic nor aggressive, but due to a sense of superiority, it has a strong sense of assimilation. This may be related to the early Huaxia civilization being a fusion of multiple civilizations.
Chinese civilization emphasizes ‘using the Xia to transform the barbarians’ and ‘teaching all without discrimination,’ which perfectly aligns with Confucius’ thought. Ironically, from the Eastern Zhou period when Confucius lived all the way to the Qing dynasty, for two to three thousand years, China was constantly under the threat of ‘barbarians’ invasions. During the Northern Dynasties, Yuan, and Qing dynasties, foreign tribes all ruled the Central Plains. According to cultural racial concepts, this was called ‘the loss of the nation and extinction of the people.’
But in reality, all the foreign emperors were assimilated by Chinese culture. This situation, whether positive or negative, has strengthened the Chinese scholar-officials’ concept of ‘national-centrism,’ making ‘protecting the species, the nation, and civilization’ unified. Especially notable were the literati of the late Ming and late Qing dynasties. This later greatly influenced Sun Yat-sen, and in turn, influenced modern Chinese political strongmen. In modern Chinese history, nationalism has not only been the driving force of modernization but also the resource and emotional foundation for strongman politics. Its cultural significance is becoming increasingly diluted, while its political significance is growing stronger.
2. Narrow nationalism
The2008 Beijing Olympics were exaggerated as a grand show of “redeeming shame.” The international community understood this, and Newsweek used the word “humiliation,” which was very clear: “China can finally indulge in its national identity, transforming from victim to winner, all thanks to the Olympic goldsmithing technique.” A grand, symbolic victory in a single stroke means the shame in Chinese history is wiped clean, turning the page of its legacy of suffering. This country is stepping into spring, reborn on the world stage, even though the Chinese may still be awkwardly searching for their confidence.” From Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao, they spared no effort in bidding for the Olympics and running sports under a “nationwide system,” fiercely competing for the “champion” on the international stage. This was subconsciously driven by the shame of being called the “Sick Man of East Asia,” something even they themselves were unaware of.
Undoubtedly, this is a series of unequal treaties against China by Western powers since 1840, resulting in the aforementioned mutation of “cultural racism.” The politicians of the Hundred Days’ and ‘Xinhai Revolutions’ attributed China’s bullying to the corruption of the Manchu emperors, while Sun Yat-sen believed that as long as the Qing were overthrown, China could become strong. This implies two unresolved issues:
First, after China shed external threats and formed a modern state dominated by the Han Chinese, it easily returned to the traditional concept of ‘distinguishing between barbarians and Chinese,’ still refusing to respect the characteristics of weaker ethnic minorities. Liang Qichao once said: “Chinese people have never known what a country truly is. Our country has been unified since ancient times, surrounded by minor barbarians without culture or artifacts, without a political system, and thus cannot be a state. Our people do not regard it as an equal nation.” Nationalism born from “cultural racism” and stimulated by external humiliation to produce “nationalism” must be extremely narrow-minded.
Second, the transition from monarchy to republic, without a democratic tradition, makes it difficult to avoid a period of authoritarian strongman rule. The strongmen regarded national unity as the highest political principle, naturally rejecting all pluralistic, equal, and tolerant values, let alone national autonomy. Therefore, Sun Yat-sen’s “Five Races (Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Hui) Tibetan Republic” design, like his republican system, was a naive “utopia”.
3. Unified Hegemony
Thetwo points mentioned above became tragic realities after the CCP came to power after the 1949 incident. The only difference is that all of this has been repackaged in a new way, transformed into a communism that transforms all nations and eradicates all traditional culture.
Ideologically, the CCP no longer pursues the “distinction between barbarians and Chinese,” but instead uses Marx’s five social forms to define the social forms of border ethnic minorities, classifying other ethnic groups into remnants of feudal serfdom, slavery, and even primitive communal systems, all undergoing “democratic reform” and eliminating “class differences” through forced form. This is the core of the CCP’s ethnic policy. So their so-called “great ethnic unity” became a political model completely unrelated to Chinese civilization and, in fact, nonexistent, to mold the 56 ethnic groups within China’s territory into one mold.
This is the most extreme form of “great unification” unprecedented in China’s four-thousand-year history. Not only will the cultures, religions, and customs of various ethnic minorities be destroyed, but even the various local cultures, customs, and characteristics of the Han people will be difficult to preserve. Today’s China is not the Confucian ‘use of the Xia to transform the barbarians,’ but even the ‘cultural racism’ of Chinese civilization has vanished.
The CCP has basically abandoned the traditional practice of the ancient Chinese central government allowing external vassal states relative autonomy, and lacks the basic concept of modern regional autonomy. It does not recognize the institutional, religious, or cultural characteristics and freedom of choice of minorities, making ethnic conflicts under unification impossible to resolve and escalating, and forcing ethnic minorities to develop strong, increasingly separatist nationalism. This, in turn, fuels the Han people’s deeply rooted sense of unity. This has led to a huge conflict of unresolved ethnic interests: today, Han Chinese make up more than 95% of the population, yet only half of the territory; Other ethnic groups, especially the Mongol, Tibetan, and Uyghur groups, although they make up only 6% of the population, still occupy half of the territory and occupy strategic positions in economic and defense sectors. In today’s increasingly resource-driven world, the issue of China’s national identity has become extremely difficult.
Liang Qichao has long said that Chinese people only have a view of ‘the world,’ not the concept of ‘nation.’ The process of constructing the “national state” in modern China coincided with the strongmen integrating society through Leninist parties. “National identity” cannot be separated from narrow nationalism and the concept of unification. Therefore, even to resolve disputes between the center and the periphery, China can only hope for a democratic system.