“June 4th”: The fifteenth human moment

https://www.facebook.com/841628330/posts/10159990306653331/ ）； ‘A4’ had just occurred and was still shallow; ‘June 4th’ was a day of killing, killing many young students and citizens, so the arrangement of numbers (days) often carried ambiguous meanings. ‘June 4th’ gained global significance precisely because of its bloodshed. China has made little historical contribution to the world and often sets bad examples. 】

Zweig believed that before a brilliant moment appears, it is a long period of mundane passage, while moments of world historical significance determine the course of history spanning decades or even centuries. He summarized fourteen moments that determined the course of humanity, such as the fall of Byzantium, the minute at Waterloo, Dostoevsky’s release before execution, and so on. Historical neutrality, good and evil balanced, collectively called “the shining stars of humanity.” He only emphasized that after these fleeting moments, the world would never be the same. Among them, he mentioned a “closed train,” like a powerful shell, which departed Switzerland in April 1917, crossed all of Germany, and finally arrived in Petrograd, Russia. Soon after, the “Ten Days That Shook the World” broke out. This cannon destroyed an empire and a world. Even the millions of devastating shells fired during World War I could not match it, because this train sent Lenin back to Russia. Famous in the mid-twentieth century, Zweig looked down at the world from a bird’s-eye view of the East and China, and his summarizing of “moments” had nothing to do with China. If we trace back in human history, the only Chinese influence found in human history is probably the invention of gunpowder.

However, Lenin and the “October Revolution” plunged the entire twentieth century into bloodshed. After World War I, three figures emerged who had a profound impact on history: Lenin, Mussolini, and Hitler—three demons; They also represent three human heresies: Bolsheviks, fascists, and Nazis; Unprecedented bloodshed also dimmed Zweig’s “neutrality” and “brilliance,” highlighting the evil of history. Thus, the history of the late twentieth century finally provided a “moment” from China, a harsh example, because it was not a “moment when the stars shine,” but a “bloody massacre night.” Since then, the history of China and the world has changed again: the massacre on June 4, 1989, and its decision-maker Deng Xiaoping; In 1989, just like Lenin seventy-two years earlier, he changed history and became a demon. The difference is that Lenin launched an armed uprising between soldiers and workers, while Deng Xiaoping commanded soldiers to suppress a peaceful petition by the people. There is also a similarity: the Lenin myth was not broken until after the collapse of the Soviet Empire, lasting nearly a century; After the June Fourth massacre, China’s economic boom made autocracy more solid, and this lasted thirty years, with the “Deng Myth” still unbroken.

the destructive impact of thirty years of economic takeoff is now obvious. It destroyed China, bringing “the Chinese nation to its most dangerous point” in terms of value and ecology. The environmental cost has become an indisputable fact today. Most of China is mired in heavy smog. The CCP, in order to save its kingdom, has gone to great lengths to destroy the Chinese nation. Land, air, and rivers have all been polluted, cancer rates among the population have risen sharply, and the public laments, “The country is broken.” Moreover, given China’s huge population, economy, and regional scope, its environmental problems will inevitably spill over to the world. Anyone who shares a planet, an ocean, or an atmosphere with China will gradually be affected, meaning China’s environmental problems will also globalize. The consequences of thirty years are extremely serious, not only for China but for the entire world, because the CCP’s authoritarianism after thirty years will become a scourge threatening humanity.

When the international community awakens from a dream and begins to confront the evil regime of the CCP, a cleansing of thirty years of history at home and abroad will also begin. At this moment, I met a gentleman—a dedicated person who would never let this period of history slip away. He poured thirty years of effort, traced, and explored the historical context and figures of the massacre, visiting the region, spending tens of millions, searching everywhere in vain, persistent, tenacious, and relentless. This 700,000-word book “Zhao Ziyang and June Fourth” is clear proof, and he directly touched on the core issues of these thirty years, revealing astonishing inner secrets. In short, this book mainly addresses three issues:

1. In response to the 1989 student movement, Deng Xiaoping wanted to kill, Zhao Ziyang opposed killing;

2. Deng mobilized troops to massacre the city, a military coup that overthrew Zhao;

3. The role and role of Yang Shangkun.

In terms of the strongman political model in 1980s China, the CCP’s power structure can also be summarized as the interaction between Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang: the former as the “regent behind the curtain,” the latter as the front operator, and the other characters as secondary. If their interaction fails, the outcome is a massacre. This book attempts to reconstruct the entire interactions between the two to explain the cause of the massacre.

April 22, Hu Yaobang’s memorial service, became a watershed moment in Deng-Zhao relations. To treat Hu Yaobang with courtesy and in line with public opinion, Zhao Ziyang decided on a grand funeral, labeled him as a “Marxist,” and allowed the public to mourn spontaneously—all of which angered Deng Xiaoping. From that day on, Deng Xiaoping’s trust in Zhao Ziyang vanished. Bao Tong said, “I believe the murderous intent began at this time, and the resolve was made then.” The subsequent events were just Deng Xiaoping continuing to observe or stabilize Zhao Ziyang’s emotions; the rest of the events were nothing more than these. Thus, the “Mourning Hu” style led to the Deng-Zhao rift and became the cause of the June 4th incident. This key detail, which no one had previously sorted out, vividly highlights how under the “new authoritarianism” model, the personal will and likes of party leaders can easily shape history.

Why did Deng get angry? This book analyzes two points: defying the emperor’s will and challenging the highest authority. Deng was dissatisfied with two points: First, Hu Yaobang was personally ordered by Deng Xiaoping to be removed, and treating him with courtesy was a form of questioning Deng Xiaoping, which he absolutely could not accept. Deng believed that Zhao Ziyang and the student movement were both trying to clear Hu Yaobang’s name; Second, in Deng Xiaoping’s view, the student movement’s calls for political reform and democracy were aimed at the Communist Party’s absolute leadership in China. Zhao Ziyang’s ambiguous stance on this issue and even sympathized with the students’ demands, which he could not forgive. This is yet another vivid footnote to the “new authoritarianism” model.

The second key point of this book is that Deng Xiaoping’s troop deployment to suppress the suppression was to overthrow the illegal military coup led by General Secretary Zhao Ziyang. This argument is clearly different from the usual claim that “mobilizing troops is suppressing the student movement,” which holds that Deng Xiaoping “disappeared” for fourteen days starting April 28th after the “April 27” march.It was clearly related to the deployment of a large-scale field army attack on the capital in early June. What does this indicate? Deng Xiaoping’s “April 25” period, which was a defining turmoil, was like throwing a match into an oil barrel. The student movement’s response to him was the “April 27” march, with banners “supporting the Communist Party of China” and breaking through police lines without anger, sending the message to society as “the people’s victory.” In this round, Deng Xiaoping was completely defeated; he was left with only one move: killing. So before “April 27,” the capital was used as a chessboard, the student movement played chess with Deng Xiaoping, marching and talking. One horse played the other, the other a cannon. When the “April 27” game arrived, the student generals became generals, and Deng Xiaoping angrily flipped the chess table.

perspective is viewed from the perspective of “democratic movements” or social conflicts. However, from the perspective of power structure, Deng Xiaoping mischaracterized the student movement as having already lost its footing and his authority was damaged. If Zhao Ziyang successfully quelled the student movement through dialogue, he would have won the “Party and the people’s hearts,” inadvertently challenging Deng’s authority, which is a major taboo. Therefore, Deng Xiaoping had to escalate from suppressing the student movement to attacking Zhao Ziyang to turn things around. Therefore, the argument of a “military coup” is undoubtedly more credible. Analyzing power relations is the essence of political science. This book reviews Deng’s “murderous intent”:

— On the day Deng Xiaoping published the “April 26 Editorial,” he ordered the PLA to enter combat readiness;

— In early May, all leave permits for military personnel to go out were canceled;

— On May 8, Deng Xiaoping summoned the heads of all major military districts, and dozens of field armies were redeployed to Beijing under the pretext of rotation, training, and camping;

— By the evening of May 17, when Deng Xiaoping was at home holding a Politburo Standing Committee meeting to “discuss martial law,” the PLA was already at the gates;

— On May 20, Deng Xiaoping held a meeting at home and decided to remove Zhao Ziyang from his post as General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee. With this, Zhao Ziyang was ousted. However, the meeting did not notify Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili, two Politburo Standing Committee members—that is, a Military Commission chairman to hold a secret meeting—to overthrow the General Secretary who was not allowed to attend. Zhao Ziyang also did not receive any party documents. Zhao Ziyang recalled: “No one told me I had already been dismissed, and of course, no one contacted me for work. Important information channels were cut off, isolating me from the outside world.”

— On May 21, Li Peng called Deng Xiaoping to suggest that an expanded Politburo meeting be held soon to dismiss Zhao. Deng Xiaoping told Li Peng: “We must wait until the main army enters Beijing before holding the expanded Politburo meeting.” This helps avoid shocks and interference, allowing you to drive with greater confidence. “Deng Xiaoping wanted to force all Politburo members to submit with bayonets, even when the army was pressing at the border;

— On June 2, Deng Xiaoping issued the order “Resolute suppression, not afraid of bloodshed,” under the strong guarantee of 200,000 troops;

— At 2:50 a.m. on June 3, he ordered Chi Haotian to “use all means to restore order”;

— On June 4, the military brutally suppressed the June 4th Democratic Movement with tanks and machine guns, completing the task of clearing Tiananmen.

— On June 9, Deng Xiaoping delivered a victory declaration at the meeting of officers above the military level of the capital’s martial law troops.

Isn’t this a military coup?

Deng Xiaoping believed that removing Zhao Ziyang through an expanded Politburo meeting or a Central Plenary Session was a legitimate means, but it was uncertain and highly uncertain. Only by deploying troops into the city could the situation be fully controlled. This process must be carried out under conspiracy conditions, through abnormal means of military violence, to achieve a change of power.

To maintain his personal authority, Deng Xiaoping was willing to launch a civil war to eliminate a political enemy, and its scope would surely expand from Beijing to Nanjing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Wuhan, and even the entire country. The civil war would make the entire student movement and the people sacrificed, and the entire reform would be doomed to fail. It would be a nationwide disaster and a global catastrophe.

From the author’s analysis, we can clearly see that the CCP’s power structure, after the Cultural Revolution (the so-called “Reform and Opening-up” era), was not “Party commands the gun” but rather “the gun commands the Party.” This system gradually formed through the “Nanchang Uprising,” Jinggangshan, and the “Zunyi Conference,” with Mao Zedong holding military command power. In this sense, the Communist Party has always been an armed and violent group. It did not change in the slight after seizing national power in 1949; Mao Zedong always held military power, which allowed him to be “lawless”; After the Cultural Revolution, it was Ye Jianying, who held military power, who, together with Hua Guofeng, facilitated Deng Xiaoping’s “comeback.” Deng could only wait until Ye Jianying’s death to seize military power and depose Hua Guofeng, thereby firmly securing the top seat.

However, after Deng Xiaoping and other elders stepped back, problems arose, so a “regency from behind the curtain” system was introduced to supplement it. On July 7, 1987, a meeting was held at Deng Xiaoping’s home to discuss personnel matters at the 13th National Congress. It was decided that Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Li Xiannian—three senior statesmen—would not join the Politburo Standing Committee, and that a ‘mother-in-law above the Standing Committee’ should be appointed. At this meeting, Bo Yibo suggested to Zhao Ziyang: At the 13th National Plenary Session, it was announced internally that future major issues would still be to be consulted with Deng and made the final decisions. What does “Deng at the helm” mean? The Standing Committee members not only had to consult and report to Deng, but he could also convene meetings at home, making decisions on major issues—how could this still be called ‘ruling from behind the curtain’? It was clearly the ‘Retired Emperor.’ Moreover, a very crucial point: this was an internal regulation that could not be made public. Once revealed, it would cause major problems, as later proven by the June Fourth massacre.

So their withdrawal from the Central Standing Committee after the 13th National Congress was purely a performance for the international audience. But to perform this play well, they had to learn from Empress Dowager Cixi of the late Qing dynasty. Zhao Ziyang described that at the Deng family meeting that day, Chen Yun “spoke a lot and was quite active, solemnly announcing that today’s decision was legal and procedural…… Deng didn’t think about it, didn’t care much, and didn’t care about such matters. With just a few strokes, the two “Empress Dowager Lao” figures leap off the page, each with their own unique charm—Chen Yun’s “Three hundred taels of silver here” is cold and hypocritical, yet reveals a “sorry” tail; Deng was stubborn and domineering, blatantly pragmatist, never taking party constitutions or national laws seriously. In this lifetime, he feared Mao Zedong.

Regarding Yang Shangkun, this book introduces the concept of “regent,” which is highly innovative and has not appeared in previous June Fourth studies. It enriches the connotations and forms of both “new authoritarianism” and “regency from behind the curtain.” The book first points out that at the time, Yang controlled the daily operations of the military and national security system, overseeing affairs in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, controlled through his confidant Yang Dezhong (Director of the Central Guard Bureau), and controlled the Central Guard Bureau through his secretary Xu Ruixin (Deputy Director in charge of confidential matters at the General Office). In 1989, Yang Shangkun was in a very critical position: on one hand, he represented Deng Xiaoping in managing the military and intelligence system; on the other, he was Deng’s sole spokesperson in the Politburo, wielding power second only to Deng. Other Politburo Standing Committee members, including General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, had to go through Yang Shangkun to meet Deng Xiaoping.

Secondly, Yang Shangkun was a loyal executor of Deng Xiaoping’s overthrow of Zhao Ziyang and the bloody suppression of the student movement, and his most important task was to monitor, stabilize, and even confuse Zhao Ziyang. He achieved this goal so perfectly that Zhao Ziyang believed Yang Shangkun supported him until his death. Yang Shangkun’s important role in the entire Tiananmen massacre surpassed that of Li Peng. Yang Shangkun was the second most infamous schemer in the massacre after Deng Xiaoping. Without Yang Shangkun, Deng Xiaoping might not have even pushed through the political coup. Yang not only misled Zhao Ziyang but also vetoed proposals such as the party group members of the People’s Congress Vice Chairman allowing Wan Li to return home early, quickly handled the Xu Qinxian disobedience incident, and on May 17 he was the first to propose martial law. These major roles were indispensable throughout the entire conspiracy and bloodshed.

After addressing these three major issues, the book also uses rich historical evidence to prove that the breakdown between Deng and Zhao over the memorial for Hu was merely a trigger. The two had fundamental differences over political system reform, so the historical reasons for their parting were a series of events such as cleaning up corruption, anti-liberalization brakes, unfair price breakthroughs, political system reforms, and the restructuring of Kanghua Company, reflecting Zhao Ziyang’s gradual abandonment of Deng Xiaoping in political ideology.

If we briefly review these thirty years of history, we find that after the Cultural Revolution, China emerged from Mao Zedong’s “omnipotent politics” ruling model and replaced it with a so-called “new authoritarianism” model, then also called the “New Gabo Model” or the “Asian Four Asian Tigers” model. This meant relying on a highly centralized political authority to promote economic opening. Both political and academic circles praised and had high expectations for the “New Authoritarianism” faction, viewing it as progress. However, the history of Deng and Zhao’s cooperation, their breakdown, and finally the massacre, fully proves its enormous limitations and flaws, even exposing its potential for catastrophic consequences. The key issue here is that the character of totalitarianism tenaciously spreads into its decline, while the non-totalitarian elements that emerge within Marxist-Leninist parties are usually fragile and struggle to survive. In the 1980s, the CCP produced two “New Deal figures,” Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, both of whom reached the highest positions in the Party and the country, yet still could not withstand the backlash of the hardliners. Just as in the late Qing, even when an emperor (Guangxu) wanted reform and a reformist aided, they were ultimately strangled in a pool of blood by conservative forces.

Thirty years ago, a massacre occurred, followed by twenty years of economic takeoff. What followed was the collapse of rich and poor, class division, and moral decline. Every Chinese over forty has witnessed these thirty years of rise and fall. China’s marketization that began in 1992 avoided ownership reform and used state power to exclude workers’ bargaining; In rural areas, after declaring “public land ownership,” they allowed open division, followed by the “land grab movement”—in Western economics, “reducing transaction costs” means reducing transaction costs by integrating contracts while guaranteeing the bargaining rights of both parties, rather than depriving some people of bargaining rights to lower “fees” for others. All this interference by state violence requires a political premise, which was provided by the June Fourth massacre, so the CCP’s bottom line is that June Fourth cannot be overturned. Ruthless deprivation requires seemingly reasonable anesthesia and comfort, so the CCP incites nationalism, placing the “state” in a hegemonic position in terms of values, discourse, and emotion, suppressing and restricting individual rights; Placing economic growth above all else—depriving the nation of all ecological resources and the survival of future generations—forged a new totalitarian model of “national security above all.” This is an upgraded version of centralization, an update of the Marxist-Leninist system that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, while the West and the international community remain dreaming of it.

After the June Fourth Massacre, the US welcomed the CCP for the Chinese market, Bush granted China “most-favored-nation status,” and Clinton accepted China into the WTO. Therefore, the “China Miracle” is the result of a conspiracy between the West and the CCP’s centralized system. The CCP survived the June Fourth crisis and escalated into ultra-strong authoritarianism, threatening the international community. The West must also bear responsibility. It took them thirty years to realize they had been deceived, but because the CCP has been nurtured and grown by Western appeasement, The international community has been forced by an unprecedented super-centralized system, and history can no longer be turned back.

The first loss of CCP legitimacy was during the Cultural Revolution; The June Fourth massacre led to a second time, which is why Chen Yun proposed the strategy of “our own descendants succeeding the throne.” They had lost faith in their traditional succession order; this deadlock had been arranged thirty years ago. Comparing Taiwan’s Chiang Ching-kuo, who deposed the heir Chiang Hsiao-wu due to the Jiangnan assassination incident and the Chiang family exited the stage of history, the CCP was the opposite, appointing the heir apparent due to the June Fourth crisis. However, the lack of “legitimacy” security in the “princelings” governance is the underlying reason Xi Jinping has regressed to Mao Zedong.

Today, “reform” is the most hegemonic term, yet it is a deadly discourse, still monopolizing the imagination and discourse of most people. All our imaginations and words are dying. Perhaps, returning to the 1980s to seek the origins and premature failures of “reform” will bring us new imagination and inspiration. This is also of great significance in studying Zhao Ziyang and June 4th.