Part One: Reflections on the 1989 Democracy Movement
Chapter 3: The Failure of the 1989 Democracy Movement Was Not Inevitable
If in war, strength determines the goal, then in politics, the goal determines strength. The better we are at setting appropriate goals, the more we can ensure we gain enough strength, which in turn guarantees our success. If you set a good goal, you’ll have more friends and fewer enemies, and you’ll win; if your goal isn’t set well, you’ll have fewer friends and more enemies, and you’ll fail.
— Excerpt from the article
1. The failure of the 1989 pro-democracy movement was not inevitable
If during the peak of the1989 democracy movement, we often felt overly optimistic, then I found that after June Fourth, many people seemed to lean toward excessive pessimism. One theoretical manifestation of this pessimism is the principle-based conclusion that the failure of the 1989 pro-democracy movement was inevitable. I cannot agree with this. Below, I intend to analyze and critique several major theories of the ‘doomed failure of the 1989 pro-democracy movement.’
2. On Chen Yizi’s ‘Five Factors Theory.’
Chen Yizi believed: The success or failure of the 1989 pro-democracy movement was actually determined by five factors: first, the degree of dissatisfaction among the masses; second, dissatisfaction among leaders; third, the organization level of the opposition; fourth, the degree of control over mass media; and fifth, the degree of control by the military. At that time, the dissatisfaction of the Chinese masses was their desire for reform, while the leaders’ dissatisfaction was their desire for conservatism, leading to sharp conflicts. The public does not have any of the following aspects; everything is controlled by the government. In this situation, the final bloody crackdown was inevitable.
Undoubtedly, the five factors summarized by Chen Yizi are highly enlightening. But it is clear that they are the factors that determine the success or failure of a full-scale war or an overall decisive battle, whereas the 1989 Democracy Movement was supposed to be a limited or localized war. Take Articles Three and Four as examples. It is well known that the goal of the 1989 Democracy Movement was precisely to establish opposition organizations and break the official monopoly on mass media. They are precisely the victories we intend to achieve, so how can they be used as prerequisites for our victory or defeat? It is precisely because we do not have A that we strive for A, and then we are told that because we do not have A, we cannot get A. This is clearly logically confusing. According to Chen Yizi’s theory of five factors, the conclusion we should draw is: we must always keep the movement at the level of a limited war to have a chance of victory; if we intentionally or unintentionally turn this movement into a decisive battle, defeat is inevitable. In the later stages of the 1989 Democracy Movement, it objectively turned into a general battle, so it was doomed to fail. I mentioned earlier that revolution requires more political conditions and I do not support certain radical revolutionary tendencies in this movement, precisely for similar reasons.
Of course, maintaining a movement at the level of limited war requires a high degree of political skill. This is the reason I mentioned earlier that reform requires more wisdom. Because there is no clear boundary between limited war and full-scale war.
3. The Distinction Between Limited War and Total War
The distinction between limited war and full-scale war is very important, and I would like to say a few more words about it.
First, many people completely deny the possibility of fighting a limited war. According to this view, no matter how mild the specific goals people propose, as long as they are truly against totalitarian authoritarianism, the authoritarian rulers will surely suppress them. This perspective is not as shallow as it first appears. In fact, it is very profound. Because authoritarian rule is somewhat like a flood dam—if you open a breach, the entire dam will collapse. When I advocate for freedom of speech, I often quote the Jewish merchant Shylock from Shakespeare’s comedy The Merchant of Venice: ‘A pound of meat only takes a pound of meat.’ ‘I use this example to illustrate that fighting for freedom of speech seems to be merely a demand for the simplest civil right.’ But the mere acquisition of this right poses a deadly threat to the entire totalitarian regime. Therefore, when the CCP’s hardliners escalate the promotion of freedom of speech to oppose the ‘Four Upholds,’ this is absurd purely logical and theoretical, but it is very correct for China’s political reality. Similarly, the direct goal of the 1989 pro-democracy movement is not logically or theoretically equivalent to the so-called ‘anti-Party and anti-socialism,’ but when the CCP’s hardliners curse it as an attempt to ‘overthrow the Communist Party,’ there is actually no major mistake. Why do the foolish CCP authorities possess such keen political intuition? Because they knew their political achievements were extremely poor and that they had lost the people’s support, their rule was not based on the people’s free choice. And it is precisely based on the people’s lack of free choice. ‘Mountains and rivers can speak, but the burial master has nowhere to eat; the lungs and innermost organs can speak, the physician’s face is ashen.’ ‘This remark was meant to mock those deceitful shaman doctors and the like.’ It is especially fitting for the Communist Party: once the people can freely express their choices, our ‘people’s government’ will inevitably collapse. Recently, with the wave of democracy in Eastern Europe, people have begun openly expressing their likes and dislikes, which has resulted in the once arrogant Communist governments being quickly brought down and taken down. This shows how deeply the Communist Party harbors resentment. Given this, how can the CCP authorities not be especially vigilant?
From the above analysis, it seems that limited warfare is simply impossible. Because any nominally limited war is, in essence, a full-scale war, or at least easily escalated into a full-scale war. If that is so, There are only two scenarios for the democratic movement: either no fight or a decisive battle; once war breaks out, there are only two outcomes: either defeat or total victory. Clearly, this conclusion is overly simplistic and fails to fully consider the complexity and subtlety of realpolitik. The key issue is: although the CCP’s hardliners instinctively realize that any demand for freedom and democracy from the people poses a profound challenge to their absolute power, they are not always able to use coercion to suppress these challenges, nor can they freely use violence. As a result, a public interaction space that resists their will and possesses autonomy gradually has the opportunity to form. And it can be continuously expanded. As a result, democratic forces can develop steadily, to the point that the balance between democracy and autocracy is unknowingly reversed.
4. Why the failure of the 1989 pro-democracy movement is not inevitable
Here, we mention a very important argument that we insist on: the CCP authorities cannot arbitrarily use violence to suppress anything they dislike. Furthermore, every power has its limits beyond its reach. We say that the CCP’s power is unlimited or absolute power. This simply means that, for the CCP, there is no legal or clearly established form of supervision or checks and balances; it does not mean that the CCP authorities can actually control and control everything in China at will. It does not mean that the CCP’s power is omnipotent.
Some friends assert that the 1989 pro-democracy movement inevitably ends in failure due to government suppression. The reason was that Deng Xiaoping, the most powerful figure in the CCP, had long been determined to suppress the crackdown. The reason he delayed in carrying it out, allowing the public to become increasingly lively and seem to have the upper hand, was simply because the party’s top leadership disagreed, and General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and others disagreed with the crackdown. Once at the upper echelons of the Party, hardliners defeat moderates, the failure of the democracy movement becomes inescapable. According to this view, the success or failure of China’s 1989 pro-democracy movement depends entirely on the will of the CCP authorities. Interestingly, most of those who support this view also agree with the idea that ‘democracy is won for itself, not by gifts from above.’ I really don’t understand how they reconcile these two completely opposing viewpoints.
Let us briefly comment on the above points.
First of all, I can admit that if the entire upper echelon of the CCP had been monotonously focused on suppression, the democratic movement would indeed face great difficulties. However, the problem lies precisely here:
First, during the rise of the 1989 pro-democracy movement, the CCP leadership was not monolithic; moderates held a significant proportion. The formation of this power structure was not only the product of ten years of reform, but also the result of a rebound after the ten-year ‘Cultural Revolution.’
Second, I want to emphasize that within the CCP ruling group at the time, besides the distinction between some being moderate and some being tough, there was also a broader background of ‘circumstances outnumbering people.’ The existence of this grand background makes it increasingly difficult for the ruling group to strengthen their control. An undeniable fact is that from the end of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ until before this ‘June 4th’, the CCP’s rule was continuously softening and weakening. This overall trend of softening and weakening does not even change with the fluctuations in the status of individual moderate and hardline figures. Undoubtedly, when Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Hu Qili, Zhu Houze, and others held power—in the second half of 1986—the moderate faction was probably at its strongest. Therefore, at least since 1987, as the moderates cut off one faction and Deng Xiaoping became increasingly hardline, the CCP leadership became more conservative and tough than in 1979, 1980, or 1986. But have people noticed an interesting phenomenon: although the CCP leadership became more conservative and tough politically after 1987, the overall control power of the ruling group’s society has not been further strengthened; on the contrary, it has continuously weakened. This is not surprising. If a screw is loose, it may be because the person tightening the screw didn’t use enough force, or it could also be because the screw and nut are worn too much, causing both sides to no longer engage. This is what they call ‘circumstances are stronger than people.’
From this, we can draw the following two important conclusions:
1. At the very top of the ruling group, the hardliners prevail, but this does not necessarily lead to a strong strengthening of the entire ruling group. If more and more members of the ruling group stop taking the favor of a few leaders,
2. At the top of the ruling group, hardliners prevail, which does not necessarily lead to a stronger degree of control over society as a whole, especially if more and more members develop a sense of independence.
This brings usto the age-old question of ‘What is power?’ What is power? Power means: even when faced with opposition. The ability to carry out one’s own will. Why is someone able to overcome others’ resistance and realize their own will? Usually, it’s not because the person has superior physical strength than others, but because they can mobilize others to serve them. Clearly, the service of this other group is voluntary, not forced. So-called power is nothing more than a kind of interpersonal relationship. When we say someone holds power, it means there is another group of people who voluntarily submit to him. Without the voluntary obedience of this group, those in power have no real power. The amount of power held by a person in power depends on the number of voluntary obedience and the extent to which these obedients control material power. If people refuse to obey the will of those in power, how can those in power force them to obey? Relying on the army, you might say, but the army is also made up of people. If the part of the army refuses to obey, who can force the army? Wasn’t Ceaușescu’s downfall the result of a military rebellion? (To be precise, it is the strength of the army that resists obedience over the strength of the army that is loyal to obedience.) ) This leads to my conclusion above: if the majority of society resists the orders of those in power, then even if this small group of people unites themselves, they will ultimately not realize their will. Therefore, whether Deng Xiaoping himself was determined to suppress the pro-democracy movement, and whether the CCP leadership unanimously advocated suppressing it, these are not enough to determine the success or failure of the movement. The real reason for the failure of the 1989 pro-democracy movement was not that the hardliners of the CCP held the upper echelons, but that the resistance forces of our entire society were not yet sufficiently strong.
However, the above statement is still somewhat ambiguous. What does it mean for hardliners to prevail? Fierce Four. Wasn’t the 26th Editorial unanimously approved by the Politburo Standing Committee of the CCP? Doesn’t that mean the hardline approach has been dominant from the very beginning? Broadly speaking, it’s unclear whether social resistance is strong enough, because we have clearly achieved something like the four. Brilliant victories like the February 7th Parade. It is clear that further analysis is needed on this issue.
In fact, whether discussing theunity or disagreements among the CCP’s upper echelons, or the strength of social resistance, it all depends on specific circumstances and circumstances. Looking back at the entire 1989 pro-democracy movement, we can clearly see this point.
As everyone knows, when the student movement first began, the CCP leadership unanimously advocated suppression. Including Zhao Ziyang, they were also in the fourth month. The original manuscript of the 26th editorial was signed. It is said that the four The draft of the February 6 editorial differs from the later official full text, but it is believed that there will be no difference in opposing the student movement. Zhao’s attitude toward the student movement was initially opposed, then turned to sympathy. This is probably a definite fact.
Initially, the CCP leadership advocated suppression. But what methods to use to suppress them was unclear at the time. It is said that Hu Qili and Qiao Shi insisted that no bloodshed be allowed. Yao Yilin doubted whether the armed police could stop the students with bare hands, but did not explicitly state the killing. Li Peng used the excuse that he was in charge of the economy to avoid this sensitive discussion. Zhao Ziyang in Korea. Finally, the Politburo Standing Committee decided to deploy large numbers of armed police and units to set up layered security lines, but not to carry any weapons. As for Deng Xiaoping himself, although he had previously discussed the issue of firing a gun, his meaning was ambiguous.
This raises a series of questions worth pondering.
Why did the Chinese authorities initially not decide to use guns to suppress the attack?
The general public answers: because the authorities want to resolve the issue without firing shots.
This answer may be good, but clearly not deep enough. If the CCP hopes to solve problems without firing guns, it is because they believe shooting can solve problems as well, but the two are comparable. Is it better to solve problems without firing? Or was it because they believed that ordering a shooting would only cause bigger trouble under the circumstances? This is the first point. Second, the CCP hopes to solve the problem without firing guns, but they must consider that not shooting might not stop the students. If the students break through the military and police blockade and succeed in the march, how will they respond?
Let’s start with the first question.
As mentioned earlier, originally. The CCP leadership opposed the student movement, including Zhao Ziyang’s faction. There is currently no evidence that the initial outbreak of the 1989 pro-democracy movement was directed or encouraged by a particular faction within the Party’s upper echelons. If one reason for the failure of the 1989 pro-democracy movement was the movement’s lack of cooperation with Zhao Ziyang’s faction, then this mistake not only shows the movement’s own strategic immaturity but also has objective reasons. Since Zhao Ziyang’s faction had never previously expressed any support for the pro-democracy movement, Therefore, the pro-democracy movement lacked sufficient trust in the Zhao faction. I will discuss this again later.
In my view, the reason the CCP hopes to resolve the issue without firing fire is due to both factors mentioned above. On one hand, even those who believed shooting would solve the problem felt that if they could resist without firing, it would be even better. After all, no ruler wants to put themselves and the people openly in confrontation. Massacring peaceful residents will only lead to a serious crisis in regime legitimacy. The CCP regime is built on violence. Violence has always been the CCP’s greatest trump card. The CCP is well aware of this. The CCP also made the people aware of this. Every Chinese citizen understands that the main reason he did not openly oppose the Communist Party was his fear of violent suppression by the CCP. No Chinese person, whether a highly educated intellectual or an illiterate old farmer, misunderstands this: it seems that his refusal to openly oppose the Communist Party was not out of fear, but out of genuine trust in the Party. There is an invisible contract between the CCP regime and the people—a contract that uses violence to force the people into enslavement. This contract is written in the hearts of the people in an unambiguous form, but its public version, as seen in various documents from the CCP authorities, is filled with grand and ambiguous language. Too embarrassed to go shirtless, Violent draped itself in a delicate costume. The sophistication of this clothing lies in its ability to both conceal and highlight oneself, much like those delicate undergarments. It must stand out to avoid making others fearless; but it must also hide itself so that others do not feel too humiliated. Humans are animals, so they fear violence; at the same time, humans are self-respecting animals, so it is hard for them to submit to open violence. In other words, just as tyranny needs to find a rational explanation for its cruelty, the people also need to find a rational justification for their submission. This means that when violence reveals itself in a covert way—that is, when violence reveals itself in a disguised way—it achieves its greatest success. Conversely, once violence is openly committed bare-chested, it can certainly instill greater fear among the people, but at the same time, it inevitably stirs up humiliation based on self-esteem. This easily prompts them to rebel bravely. If such humiliation is both severe and widespread, the resulting resistance can be very powerful. Therefore, some within the CCP authorities may believe that shooting and killing under the circumstances at the time would not be enough to calm the situation; instead, it might escalate it.
This is very important in the latter part. Deng Xiaoping said, “Shooting early is better than firing later.” Many people also agree. If the CCP authorities killed people on April 27. People wouldn’t die so much, and even bigger trends would never happen afterward. Whether these views align with reality can no longer be verified by actual evidence. Historical events are one-off; history cannot strictly repeat itself. This makes it impossible to confirm or deny any assertion that ‘if things hadn’t been done this way back then, the consequences would have been different.’ History only records facts, meaning it only records the possibilities that may come true; however, studying history requires us to pay attention to those possibilities that have not yet come true. We must study the various possibilities that have not entered reality—what is truly possible and what is illusory. The deeper we study this, the more wisdom we can draw from history. This is precisely the significance of our historical research.
We say the CCP holds the barrel of the gun. This is actually just a metaphor. It doesn’t mean the same as Zhang San holding a gun in his hand. Zhang San gripped a gun, which meant the gun was completely under Zhang San’s control, including his bizarre will when he went berserk. For example, Zhang San could shoot his mother to death, as long as this strange will had truly formed in his mind. But whether it was Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zedong, or even the entire CCP Politburo, it was absolutely impossible for the People’s Liberation Army to collectively shoot soldiers’ own parents. That is, for those in power to make their orders effective, they must consider the acceptability of the executor—in other words, they must limit the content of their orders. When it comes to those in power, we must remember that they are never united in one place; there are always open and covert struggles, and everyone hopes others will stumble to elevate their own status. In short, real politics is far more complex than the poor concepts, arbitrary reasoning, and simplistic conclusions of many of our friends. Philosophers of the General Semantic School point out that things possess extremely complex and diverse characteristics, and words and concepts inevitably omit many features. Therefore, just as a map is not a territory, words are not things. However, our thinking inevitably relies on words or concepts, which carries the danger of causing our thinking to stray from reality and distort reality. If we do not pay attention to clarifying the precise meaning of concepts and are keen to think in crude, figurative language, the likelihood of making mistakes increases.
Returning to the specific question just raised. 4. Why didn’t the Chinese authorities order a shooting at 27 o’clock? First, at that time, hardliners themselves would not act in unison. Even though deep down, hardliners may all advocate killing, but everyone hopes others will take the lead in doing this evil deed, standing by and reaping the benefits. The result was that no one stepped forward, and the massacre order was issued openly and directly. Hardliners have at least four fears: first, becoming eternal criminals; second, fearing opposition from colleagues; third, fearing misconduct during soldiers’ execution; fourth, fearing strong public backlash. With these four fears arises the fifth fear: the fear of becoming a villain and being the villain, only to be betrayed by others who act as good people.
From the public’s perspective, four. The scale of the February 7th Movement was still quite limited, but it was full of momentum and was at its peak (this was the opposite phase of the popular decline on the eve of June 4th). Hundreds of students left farewell letters, truly carrying the spirit of ‘a hero departs and never returns.’ If the authorities ordered a shooting, dozens of deaths would not be enough to scare them away. At the same time, the goals of the student movement were quite low-key, much milder than later slogans like ‘Down with Deng Xiaoping’ or ‘Down with Li Peng,’ making it obviously easier to win sympathy. Note that arousing enthusiasm and gaining sympathy are not the same thing. To inspire enthusiasm and make more people willing to participate, you generally need a slogan that hits the nail on the head, while to win sympathy, the gentler the better. 4. The slogans of the February 7th Student March were extremely mild. Therefore, it may not inspire many people to throw themselves into it, but if a bloody massacre occurs, it will inevitably provoke widespread and intense sympathy and righteous indignation. 4. The challenge of the February 7th March lies not only in its slogans but also in the march itself. If the authorities are in the fourth. Firing on February 7 could easily cause a sudden and intense shock throughout society, including within the CCP’s party, government, and military. The intensity and suddenness of this shock (which had greatly diminished by June 4th) could easily trigger massive chaos. Combined with the inconsistency among hardliners and the fact that the enlightened faction had not yet been purged, it was possible that the murderer would be immediately isolated and thrown out to appease the people.
Putting aside the above analysis, Even if we believe the CCP authorities are capable of the fourth Erqi ordered the shooting immediately, so it’s not hard to understand why they didn’t make this decision. Because they believe that doesn’t count. Everyone should consider the cost of doing things. If you only have a Joker in hand, it doesn’t guarantee you have a solid chance of winning the game, unless your opponent wants to beat you by digging the bottom. You can use that Joker card in a decisive match. If the other person always eats fifty-tenths, you’ll feel very troubled. Throwing out the king for just five or ten points is just not counting, and the result is that you can only watch your opponent win point by point. After the U.S. acquired atomic bombs, some Americans said that from now on, we no longer needed to develop conventional armed forces; after all, we had atomic bombs, enough to annihilate the other side. But this approach immediately ran into trouble in practice. Others would attack you bit by bit, and you either had nothing to fight back or to prevent, or you could only drop the atomic bomb. When the enemy’s attack seems (note, it does appear) less disruptive, it becomes very difficult to use atomic bombs. Not only does it carry the eternal blame, but internal communication may not be possible, creating internal crises. In the end, others still get the advantage. Swallowing may be impossible, but encroachment always works. If this continues, over time, the balance of power will change, and as the balance of power changes, the rulers’ standards for worthwhile will gradually decrease, because their capital keeps shrinking. At first, they felt that the public’s private criticism and attacks were ‘intolerable’; in the end, even if they were asked to hand over all their power, as long as their own safety was guaranteed, they felt it was a matter of course.
Next, let’s discuss the second question. The CCP issued the fourth The editorials on February 6, Deng Xiaoping’s speech, and layers of military and police blockades were set up in an attempt to scare away the students. But they can’t ignore that these methods might not be effective—what should they do next?
According to Chen Yizi’s later account, when the four… After the 27th day, Zhao Ziyang returned to Beijing. Deng Xiaoping once asked him for a solution to the student movement. Zhao Ziyang said there are two methods: soft and hard. The hard method is divided into two types: empty hard and real hard. The so-called hard air probably refers to something like four. Before the 27th day, the approach was: stern threats, military and police blockade. ‘Solid and hard’ naturally refers to real swords and guns, bloodshed and killing. The soft approach avoids provoking students’ resentment, uses appeasement to calm the movement, and then punishes a ‘small group.’
Some doubt whether these claims are true or reliable. Actually, that doesn’t affect our analysis. Including the previously quoted in section four. Whether the various opinions of the senior CCP leaders on the eve of February 7th are accurate does not hinder our discussion here. Because judging from the CCP’s public statements and practices, we can basically conclude that on April 4. Before the 27th day, they used hard methods—empty hardness rather than real hardness. 4. After the seventh day of the second seven, the soft method was used for a period of time. Both the hardline and soft approaches aim to strike at a ‘small group,’ with the only difference being how to deal with mass movements. Hard and empty methods advocate using empty threats to scare off mass movements, while soft approaches advocate avoiding direct conflict and using moderate measures to drag out the movement. 4. The brilliant victory of the February 7th march declared the complete bankruptcy of the Air and Hard Plan, and thereafter, the CCP switched to soft measures.
Zhao Ziyang’s soft approach was similar to Hu Yaobang’s previous cold treatment approach. Its main purpose is to oppose bloody killings and to avoid open and intense confrontation between authorities and the public. This means that if the democratic movement gains considerable momentum, the authorities will have to adopt some form of easing. However, we must understand that politically, a gesture carries substantial meaning. Once the people discovered it, as long as they could make good use of the right timing and location, it could trigger large-scale mass movements. The government is powerless against them, which undoubtedly gives them a sense of strength and confidence. This sense of strength and confidence is the most important psychological foundation for the people to carry out peaceful resistance movements.
It should be said that the CCP in April… Before the 27th day, he decided not to shoot, partly hoping to scare off students with forceful tactics, but at the same time, he was mentally prepared for the future situation if the forceful measures failed. Therefore, it is not strictly realistic to say that the CCP leadership, or even Deng Xiaoping, was determined to carry out the massacre from the very beginning. Because the decision on the ‘hard air’ approach was neither unilaterally made by the moderates behind Deng Xiaoping’s or Li Peng’s back, disregarding Politburo routines, nor was it made after heated debate to reject the hardliners’ positions. Note, when I say this, I’m not denying that hardliners intended to suppress with gunfire from the start. I just say that at the time, the hardliners did not explicitly advocate for shooting. It must be understood that in any decision-making process involving two or more people, expressing an intention or a tendency is one thing; clearly stating and insisting on a position is another. It is common to see situations where, when faced with a thorny problem that could come at a high cost if not solved, those who support extreme measures, out of concern for the serious consequences they may cause, generally do not proactively, clearly, or firmly state their views and insist on making them the final decision. Instead, they often show ambiguity and distrust of mild approaches. Their calculation is: if others accept their proposal and make extreme decisions, and succeed, the credit goes to themselves. At least including myself—the decision was made by someone else: if we lost, the fault was on someone else, and we could relatively shift the blame—after all, we never gave the order directly. If others ignore your hints or hints and make a gentle decision, and it succeeds, you won’t lose out. Warnings and warnings are not necessarily wrong, since you haven’t directly opposed or lost, you can appear as a prophet, humbling others and elevating yourself. Since those who internally support extreme approaches generally have the above mindset, it is no surprise that in the initial decision-making process, the more moderate proposal—that is, the one with some margin—tends to prevail.
Anyone who studies or engages in real-world politics should understand that any regime, including those with rather authoritarian dictatorships, has a very complex major decision-making process. If one does not carefully analyze this complex decision-making process and the more intricate changes it causes after implementation, and settles for a rough and simple arbitrary conclusion with one or two sentences, this is reckless for researchers and dangerous for participants. The reason I am writing this lengthy article, just as I once sought to make lengthy arguments for freedom of speech, is not only to help more people accept my views, but also to encourage more people to adopt a clearer, more rational, more responsible attitude toward such an important issue, and to develop a habit of thinking more rigorously and meticulously. This may be off-topic, but it truly is a wish deep in my heart.
4. The February 7th march was a great victory. Although the adjusted march slogans are a bit more low-key than before, But its victory was by no means a Ah Q-style victory—it was a real victory. It is an extremely successful public challenge by the Chinese people to the CCP authorities over the past forty years. Every Chinese person deeply felt this victory. ‘The power of the people is invincible’ and ‘Long live the people’—these long-considered hollow and pedantic slogans suddenly gained the richest meaning. The authority of the CCP, including Deng Xiaoping personally, plummeted in a single day. 4. Erqi is indeed a historic day. On this very day, the psychological advantage of the autocrats over the people collapsed, and the psychological disadvantage of the people against the autocrats was reversed. The elimination of fear is the most fundamental, even the only condition for the bankruptcy of an authoritarian system. As mentioned earlier, when the CCP was in April… When the decision not to shoot was made on the eve of the 27th day, in fact, there was already some mental preparation to accept this situation, but 4. Erqi’s shock was even stronger than they had anticipated. The CCP had originally considered that if the threat of a blockade failed, it would make concessions. Now, they have no choice but to back down, and make significant concessions.
Note that when we say the CCP authorities have made concessions, we are not saying they are willing to make such concessions. Of course, the hardliners in the CCP harbor a desire to avoid the wave and wait for an opportunity to counterattack. However, being unwilling to accept defeat and seeking revenge is one thing; suffering setbacks and having to give in is another. 4. The CCP’s retreat after February 7th was a genuine retreat; in other words, it was a retreat against the tide of non-nationalism, not the feigned defeat of Mao Zedong’s ‘open strategy’ to lure the enemy deeper. Making this distinction is important. In today’s changing times, some friends project their current pessimism or indignation onto past events, resulting in descriptions of the 1989 democracy movement that neither fit the objective circumstances of the time nor the subjective mindset of themselves. These people claim that throughout the entire 1989 pro-democracy movement, the CCP has never made any concessions. (In response to my suggestion that the pro-democracy movement should ‘quit while ahead,’ they retorted that there was never a ‘good’ in the 1989 movement.) These friends probably don’t realize that when they deny that the CCP has ever made concessions—a view that seems radical—they are actually denying that the democracy movement has ever won, and thus are actually quite pessimistic.
Recently, Mr. Su Shaozhi wrote an article titled “A Type Analysis of Reforms in Eastern Europe,” pointing out that when grassroots forces are not strong enough, the authorities’ attitude tends to be tougher, the likelihood of compromise is lower, and the likelihood of violent repression is higher. This view is fundamentally correct but somewhat general. Because, as mentioned earlier, it is detached from analyzing specific situations and situations. It must be recognized that engaging in political struggle under peaceful conditions is different from engaging in military struggle under extraordinary conditions. The general characteristic of military struggle is that both sides have clear barriers, and the strength of each side is basically determined (I say ‘basically’ because there is still a variable side here). Political struggles are different. The characteristic of political struggle is that there are no two teams with clear barriers and relatively certain barriers that fully and consciously confront each other. Therefore, in political struggles, the skill of maneuvering and maneuvering is especially important. It is well known that Democrats outnumber Republicans in the U.S. Congress, but that does not mean any Republican proposal has no hope of success in Congress. That also depends on what kind of proposal they make. In peaceful democratic movements, we must be adept at making such proposals that can win more participation, support, or sympathy, while weakening the power of opponents, especially isolating those who seek to suppress them with violence. If in war, strength determines the goal, then in politics, the goal determines strength. The better we are at setting appropriate goals, the more we can ensure we gain enough strength, which in turn guarantees our success. If you set a good goal, you’ll have more friends and fewer enemies, and you’ll win; if your goal isn’t set well, you’ll have fewer friends and more enemies, and you’ll fail. The setback of the 1989 pro-democracy movement was, of course, due to the enemy’s strength and our weakness, but from our perspective, this vicious change in the balance of power was also caused by the escalation of our resistance goals. Under the conditions at the time, there was no guarantee of victory or defeat for the pro-democracy movement; it depended entirely on whether our strategic goals were appropriate.
Reflections on China’s Democracy Movement (Oxford University Press, 1992).
Hu Ping website