Nail the Executioner to the Pillar of Historical Shame — Reading Wu Renhua’s New Book “Martial Law Troops During the June Fourth Incident” (Hu Ping: 200907)

Nail the executioner to the pillar of shame in history

— Reading Wu Renhua’s New Work, ‘Martial Law Troops in the June Fourth Incident‘

Hu Ping, July 2009

Following last year’s June 4th publication “The Inside Story of the Bloody Tiananmen Clearance,” this year Wu Renhua has published a new 600-page book titled “Martial Law Troops in the June Fourth Incident.” As soon as this book was published, it immediately attracted widespread attention. The author has given multiple special lectures in North America and Western Europe, and major overseas media outlets—including Radio Free Asia, Voice of America, BBC, and France Internationale—have all featured special reports on the book.

In 1977, Wu Renhua was admitted to the Department of Chinese Language and Literature at Peking University, majoring in classical literature, earning both bachelor’s and master’s degrees. In 1986, he began working at the Institute of Ancient Legal Books Collation at China University of Political Science and Law, serving as the director of the research office. During the 1989 pro-democracy movement, Wu Renhua was one of the earliest teachers to join the movement. On June 3, Wu Renhua was entrusted by the “Joint Conference of Patriotic Constitutional Maintenance from All Sectors in the Capital” to organize a special patrol team to maintain order at Tiananmen Square; At the start of the crackdown, he was on the highest floor of the base of the Monument to the People’s Heroes in the center of the square, among the last to withdraw. In July 1990, Wu Renhua jumped into the sea to swim to Hong Kong, then moved to the United States, where he served as editor-in-chief of the Press Freedom Herald and is now secretary-general of the China Constitutional Political Consultative Conference.

Addressing several major issues related to the June Fourth Incident

Drawing on his identity as a participant throughout the 1989 Movement and a witness to the June Fourth massacre, the author, adhering to the rigorous attitude and professionalism of a bibliographer, wrote this book “Martial Law Troops in the June Fourth Incident” after years of investigation and verification, answering a series of major questions. These questions include: Which units participated in the June Fourth massacre? There were 14 army group armies carrying out the martial law mission in Beijing, as well as the 15th Airborne Army directly under the Central Military Commission. This was the only airborne army in China at the time and the most elite force in the country; Additionally, there was the 14th Artillery Division of the Beijing Military Region; The 1st Tank Division of the Tianjin Garrison District; The First and Third Guard Divisions of the Beijing Garrison; There is also the Beijing Corps of the Armed Police Force. The 14 group armies sent troops to Beijing were not all; the number of officers and soldiers there ranged from 200,000 to 250,000.

so many troops? With so many martial law troops, their official mission was certainly to suppress the pro-democracy movement, but also to prevent possible coups and mutinies within the Party.

Which units mainly committed shooting? One unit that fired was the 38th Army entering from West Chang’an Avenue, and the 15th Airborne Army entering Beijing from Zhushikou, Tianqiao, and Qianmen facing south of Tiananmen. Other units also opened fire, but these two units killed the most.

Did the soldiers open fire on their own or were they following orders? Is there an order to open fire? The author ruled out the possibility that each army group army could have fired without authorization, pointing out that there was a clear order to fire. The author found 11 specific pieces of evidence as evidence, including one personally written by Major General Wu Jiamin, commander of the 40th Group Army, all mentioning the order to fire, and specifically how the order was received. The shooting was ordered around 10 p.m. on June 3. The advance command of the martial law troops was located at the Military Museum, and its clearance command was at the Great Hall of the People. The shooting order came from the forward command of the military museum. The first to receive the order to open fire was the 38th Army. The first shot was fired at the Wukesong intersection, and it is known that the first victim was killed there.

When did the massacre occur, and where were the main locations? On June 3, the PLA’s martial law troops were ordered to march forcibly toward Tiananmen Square, implementing the plan to clear the area. From the night of June 3rd to 1:30 a.m. on June 4th, the massacre mainly took place at Muxidi on West Chang’an Avenue, Fuxingmen Interchange, Xidan Intersection, and the overpass south of Tiananmen Square, Zhushikou, Qianmen, and other locations. After 1:30 a.m. on June 4, the massacre mainly took place around Tiananmen Square, with the most brutal location being the south entrance of Nanchizi Street, located on the east side of the Tiananmen Gate Tower.

Throughout the entire incident, which units behaved the worst and most brutally? Among the June Fourth Incidents, the most brutal was the Liubukou Incident. At 5:20 a.m. on June 4, at Liubukou near West Chang’an Avenue and Xinhua Gate, a large number of unarmed students had already evacuated from Tiananmen Square and were on their way back to campus. The martial law troops actually deployed a convoy of tanks, but instead of the wide fast and slow lanes, they sped along the bicycle lanes and chased the students, causing 11 deaths and multiple injuries. The tragic attack belonged to the 1st Tank Division, commanded by Regiment Commander Luo Gang and Deputy Commander Jia Zhenlu. The tank that ran through the crowd was numbered 106. Which units and soldiers behaved passively or even refused to carry out killing orders? What kind of persecution did they suffer afterward? Indeed, many soldiers were reluctant to shoot at civilians. For example, Xu Qin, commander of the 38th Army, was first dismissed for disobedience and later sentenced to five years in prison; He Yanran, commander of the 28th Army, and Zhang Mingchun, political commissar, were demoted and transferred; Xu Feng, commander of the 116th Infantry Division of the 38th Army, lost his military post; and many lower-ranking soldiers were officially claimed missing at the time, but in reality, they had left the scene and received even harsher punishments.

The author also researches the casualties of military and police during the June Fourth Incident. Because after June Fourth, the CCP had repeatedly claimed that counterrevolutionary riots had occurred in Beijing, and the military had no choice but to open fire to suppress it. Based on his own investigation, Wu Renhua pointed out that during the June Fourth Incident, 15 military police officers died, none before 11 p.m. on June 3, 1989, indicating that the military suppressed the incident first.

Wu Renhua listed the military ranks, time of death, and place of death for the 15 victims. Among them, six soldiers from the artillery brigade of the 38th Group Army received an urgent order on the night of June 3rd to transport riot equipment to Tiananmen Square. Due to excessive speed, they overturned at the intersection of Cuiwei Road, causing the fuel tank to explode, and they were unable to break free, resulting in their deaths. Second Lieutenant Wang Jingsheng of the 24th Group Army suddenly fell ill and died on July 4, 1989, one month after the June Fourth crackdown, while patrolling troops. His death notice clearly states that heart failure was a major cause of death. Yu Jinglu, a major and propaganda officer in the political department of the 39th Army, was killed by the martial law troops themselves. On the night of June 3, 1989, Yu Jinglu was advancing with martial law troops toward Tiananmen Square, but his troops were blocked by the masses. Eager to take photos of the clearing at Tiananmen Square, Yu Jinglu ignored others’ advice, changed into civilian clothes, and headed alone toward Tiananmen. On the way, he was shot and wounded (martial law troops would shoot anyone who took photos), and died after being taken to the hospital by the locals. The deaths of these eight individuals had nothing to do with the so-called “rioters.” Additionally, only seven deaths were related to so-called “rioters,” which occurred after the military opened fire and massacred. A small number of civilians, furious, attacked and killed several attacking soldiers.

The author specifically points out that as long as the army listens to the people’s advice and halts their advance, the people will be very friendly to them. For example, outside the east gate of the Temple of Heaven, 60,000 to 70,000 civilians surrounded more than 300 officers and soldiers layer by layer. Because these soldiers did not fire or advance, not a single one was harmed; On the contrary, the locals brought them food and drink, and even took the initiative to send 11 injured soldiers en route to the hospital for emergency treatment.

Significant and far-reaching significance

Wu Renhua’s book is of great significance and far-reaching. The Chinese are a nation that values history above all else. For Chinese people, history is our religion. We do not believe in the Last Judgment, but we do believe in the judgment of history. We do not believe in heaven or hell, but we do believe that good people will be remembered for generations, while bad people will be infamous for eternity. In China, the only thing that can make bad people wary is that their names will be recorded in history and condemned by future generations. Wu Renhua spent so much effort uncovering the inside story of the June Fourth massacre, finding out the numbers of martial law troops and the names of officers and soldiers, and so on, all to forever nail these people to the pillar of historical shame.

The June Fourth Incident forced people to consider the issue of soldiers obeying orders. Simply saying “a soldier’s duty is to obey orders” is not enough; just as the American military oath states, soldiers also have the duty to disobey illegal orders. If soldiers carry out illegal orders, they must bear responsibility. Xiong Yan, who served as a military chaplain in the U.S. military, clearly explained this point in his article “The Duty of Soldiers and the June Fourth Massacre” (published in Beijing Spring, June 2009), which is well worth our careful reading.

There is no doubt that Deng Xiaoping was the main culprit of the June Fourth Massacre. With the heinous crime of June Fourth alone, Deng Xiaoping made himself the greatest tyrant and butcher in history. Here, there’s no such thing as a 30/70 or 70/30 split. As British political commentator Cecil said: “There is no moral savings bank where people can accumulate good deeds so that at the right time they can withdraw a considerable amount to offset the injustices they have done.” A doctor who kills a patient under the guise of practicing medicine is a murderer and must be punished. This had nothing to do with whether he had cured other patients. A so-called bad person does not mean that in all their lifetime, bad deeds outweigh good deeds, but rather that they have done something that violates human moral boundaries. If that doctor cries out in court, “I have cured 100 patients, but only 10 have died.” I’ve done ten times more good deeds than bad ones, so at least I should be open on September 1. How can you say I’m a bad person? “Is it okay?” If someone kills someone and still refuses to confess, we should praise their achievements in other areas, treat them with some kind of merit and demerit, and give them a positive place in history. Why should they still confess to their crimes? Even more seriously, when future generations encounter similar situations, why shouldn’t they follow the same procedure? To justify past sins is to indulge future sins. Unless we insist on such a standard and create such public opinion, making everyone realize that some things are absolutely unacceptable. Once done, no matter how many good deeds you have done before or after, you will never be able to wash away the shame of being a historical sinner. Otherwise, we would be tantamount to acknowledging the legitimacy of such crimes and providing a dangerous example for their recurrence.

These are my thoughts after reading Wu Renhua’s new book.

—— “Spring in Beijing” July 2009 issue http://beijingspring.com/bj2/2009/380/2009630133334.htm