[Note: Eight and Nine, two vital points: student hunger strike and Zhao Ge’s ‘throwing Deng’ away, both lead to a sharp turn of events; Especially the latter, some commentators say, “Adding unnecessary words can ruin the country.” Thirty years later, we still cannot draw a definitive conclusion about this; we can only analyze. My guess is that Zhao Ziyang was laying Deng on the table, placing Deng Xiaoping in a ‘nationwide referendum,’ or leaving it to the people to judge right and wrong, without caring about the consequences. First, there are ethical issues of leadership responsibility here; Second, this was probably the root of his refusal to reflect until his death. 】
“Zhao Ziyang’s Recordings and Memoirs” is a precious private document, comparable to the “Khrushchev Memoirs.” Zhao Ziyang provided a contextual analysis of the inside story and causes of the ’89 Incident,’ becoming an authoritative historical source to restore this critical historical moment. However, this creates a tragic tension between his final inability to fully explain a major detail. This detail concerns his conversation with Gorbachev, an event described as the “eye of the storm,” which is only explained with “ambiguity.” This also leaves value and space for discovery.
political transparency and open decision-making are the lifeblood of totalitarian systems. When major social conflicts arise, it becomes even more severe—once touched, it can explode. The explosive impact caused by Zhao Ge’s meeting at Diaoyu Island “exposed the decision of the Central Standing Committee” (Zhao Yu) has been witnessed worldwide, and to this day there is no reassuring explanation. It can be called a “twenty-year regret.” This article attempts to offer a possible explanation. My explanation is not to position Zhao Ziyang as a leader, a nobleman, or a devoted person, but first and foremost regard him as a politician. He has already passed away in the underworld, worthy of historical commentary.
appeased the old man
Hu Yaobang’s death and the sudden rise of student movements left reformers deeply worried within the party. Chen Yi-Tzu recalled that his secretary brought a ‘relationship chart’ posted at Renmin University. ‘When I saw it, I felt it was going to be terrible. This ‘relationship chart’ almost criticized and criticized every senior leader—there was both dissatisfaction and pranks. They really naively treated politics like a game! For example, under the name ‘Li Tieying,’ it was written: ‘Deng Xiaoping’s illegitimate son, seized key Politburo positions through nepotism.’ A senior official’s child originally supported the student, but after seeing the picture, he turned around and cursed, “Students are making trouble!” 』
he realized that “this movement might turn into another tragedy,” because he knew that as early as the Second Field Army, Deng Xiaoping prospered while opposing him. Mao Zedong also criticized him for being “aloof and detached from the masses.” Mao Zedong was a ‘masses activist,’ Deng Xiaoping was a ‘fearful of the masses.’ In the face of humiliation, Deng Xiaoping would never make the slightest concession. He felt that on one hand, he needed to persuade students to be rational; on the other, he needed to quickly smooth things over the Deng family.
On the afternoon of May 3rd, Chen Yizi arrived at the Deng family home with Deputy Director Li Jun and Bai Nanfeng, where they talked with Deng Pufang for a full five hours. During the Cultural Revolution, Chen Yizi fell into trouble at Peking University and became acquainted with Deng Pufang. During reforms, the two often exchanged views. In 1987, to stop the wrongful anti-liberalization practices, they even cooperated. Chen first pointed out the false reports from Li Ximing and Li Peng, saying the ‘April 26’ editorial would only intensify conflicts, and if this policy continues, China will fall into disaster.
Deng: “So what do you suggest we do?”
Chen: “The way to ease the conflict now is to invite your old man to come out and speak.”
Deng: “We’ve come this far, what else can we say?”
Chen: “Students both hate and hope for your old masters. They hate the harsh ‘426’ editorials, and they hope the old man says a few patriotic words about students. For example, when meeting foreign guests or reporters, he said: ‘The kids are all patriotic. Young people always want to get things done faster and better, but China is so big and has such a large population; many things can’t be accomplished in three or five years.’ Haste makes waste!” Saying this is both an affirmation, a criticism, and the conflict eases.”
Deng: “That’s actually a good idea. I’ll talk to the old man.”
Chen Yizi knew something was seriously wrong, but he was well-versed in decision-making mechanisms. Thinking quickly to calm the old man was the emergency measure at this moment. However, he could only reach Deng Xiaoping’s son.
“Deng at the helm” reveals three stories
Regarding this incident, the CCP cannot explain it; Zhao Ziyang and his aides are the only sources of explanation. There have been three different explanations, all based on a temporal dislocation:
On May 16, 1989, Mr. Goss met Deng Xiaoping in the morning and Zhao Ziyang in the afternoon. Which was the “highest-level talks”? This “specification” issue creates a “political opportunity”—in fact, this is a loophole reserved by the authoritarian regime; who can exploit it and how best to use it is just a technical issue.
the earliest appearance of “Chen Theory”—Chen Yizi offered a statement at the beginning of his exile: the Soviet delegation questioned Deng Xiaoping for holding no party position, so what was the meaning of Ge Shi when he met him? So Wang Ruilin called and asked Zhao Ziyang to explain things to Mrs. Ge in the afternoon. This statement was flawless, indicating that Zhao’s camp never intended to give anyone leverage from the start.
Years later, there was another “Bao Shuo”—after Bao Tong was released from prison, he said that in Qincheng, he took on this responsibility himself, saying that, based on the introduction from the International Liaison Department, he wrote a speech for Zhao Ziyang, indicating that although Deng retired, he would still be at the helm.
the final “Zhao Shuo” is found in Zong Fengming’s “Conversations During Zhao Ziyang’s House Arrest” published by “Open” and Zhao himself’s “Recording Memoirs.” The main idea is that it addresses the popular claim of “ruling behind the curtain,” and that this secret was revealed to “protect Deng’s image,” “entirely with good intentions.”
According to Ming Pao, Zhao cited a conversation with Xinhua reporter Yang Jisheng, mentioning more specific details: Deng Xiaoping insisted that only his meeting with Gorbachev counted as the “highest-level Sino-Soviet talks,” and repeatedly emphasized, “I must tell him this.” However, for some reason, he forgot to say this during the meeting, so Zhao Ziyang had to tell Ge the secret of “Deng Xiaoping at the helm.” Zhao told Yang, “I also told Bao Tong that Comrade Xiaoping might really be old and his memory has faded…… These words were originally meant to convey to Gorbachev what Deng Xiaoping had forgotten to say, hoping that when Deng Xiaoping returned to China, he would have an explanation for this trip. As for how the outside world would interpret it,If any misunderstandings arise, I won’t be able to control them.”
General Secretary must “live broadcast”
I can provide corroborating evidence here: twenty years ago, I heard a witness personally testify: at that time, Zhao Ziyang arrived at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse ahead of others and urgently asked about a detail: was this meeting “live-streamed”? What surprised reporters was that the General Secretary had never cared about this detail before, and the key to “live broadcast” is that no single sentence from the speaker can be cut, thus avoiding news censorship. This is why the CCP rarely allows “live broadcasts.” It is said that when reporters told him it was indeed a “live broadcast,” Zhao Ziyang blurted out in Henan dialect: “Good!” Then he sat down, rhythmically tapping the armrest of the sofa with one hand as he began to draft his plan.
Based on the details of this “live broadcast,” it was clear at a glance that Zhao Ziyang had come prepared. If he wanted to reveal some earth-shattering secret he couldn’t reveal, it would be right at the height of Tiananmen Square’s intense battle. Soon, the whole country was in an uproar. The slogans appearing in the square were unprecedented:
Deng Da? Party Conference?
Whether it’s a white or black cat, as long as it leaves the stage, it’s a good cat;
curtain is broken! Xiaoping, thank you for your hard work, please retire;
Thinking of Xiaoping, hoping for Xiaoping, Xiaoping coming brings trouble;
No need for a Chinese-style regent;
Such “curtain governance” will not tolerate the nation;
People get old, and the strings can’t be tuned correctly;
Lian Po is old, can he still eat?
the world is “public”;
people over eighty will be confused;
We hope Xiaoping returns home and support you as a professional player;
hoping Deng Xiaoping would go with the tide of history and return home;
Yibin Normal College in Sichuan welcomes Xiaoping back home for retirement;
Hello Xiaoping (1984), Hutu (1989);
Clean governance, not ruling behind the curtain;
look for the government behind the curtain;
Deng Xiaoping (1985) Gorbachev (1958) ……
Yan Jiaqi, Bao Zunxin, and others issued the “May 17 Declaration,” calling Deng Xiaoping “an emperor without the title of emperor, an old and incompetent dictator,” with a large number of intellectuals signing their names.
two “May 17 Family Meetings.”
After Zhao Ziyang’s decision to oppose Deng Xiaoping’s “martial law” was invalidated, he returned home feeling heavy-hearted. At dinner on May 17, he told his family: ‘I will carry out Deng Xiaoping’s decision to impose martial law, and may even serve as General Secretary. If I don’t follow and insist on opposing my views, fate may be harsh and affect your future. But I can’t make such a decision.’ His family unanimously supported his “decision.” From then on, Zhao Ziyang was placed under house arrest for fifteen years and eight months, while his family was treated unjustly without exception.
Meanwhile, at dinner on May 17, Deng Xiaoping’s family sat together for a meeting. It is said that Deng Rong pointed to the “May 17th Declaration” by Yan Jiaqi, Bao Zunxin, and others, saying, “Looks like they’re going to kick us out of our home and chop us into mince!” Deng Xiaoping, who was already ‘afraid of the masses,’ made the final decision.
two different “May 17 Family Meetings,” which determine China’s future future.
However, because it was a “family meeting,” a “national decision” was actually made entirely by members of China’s two top families. The only difference was that the Deng family decided that the CCP’s vested interest groups would divide up the world from then on; But the Zhao family’s decision is for all family members to bear the consequences of their unscrupulous actions, sending this nation to hell.
Chen Yizi went to see Bao Tong on the morning of the 20th:
‘ His resolute face was filled with righteousness and righteous indignation. As soon as he saw me, he said, “Ziyang’s approach to solving problems on the path of democracy and the rule of law is the only reasonable approach to solving problems. But once again, he illegally overturned the legitimate General Secretary! Martial law? What good outcome will come from opposing the people and the hearts of the people? This is like fighting a cornered beast!” I interjected, “Maybe they’ll just jump over the wall in desperation?!” He stood up excitedly and said, “I really want to hang up a sign reading ‘CPC Central Committee Member Bao Tong’ and go to Tiananmen to join the students in a hunger strike and protest! The students are clearly patriotic, yet they insist on being unrestful. Is there any right or wrong?” We are deeply outraged by Li Peng’s reckless actions.’
Ziyang is in the limelight
Why did Zhao Ziyang make such a big move?
After he exhausted all his efforts and still could not persuade Deng Xiaoping to revoke the order, he decided to appeal to public opinion and international attention, bringing Deng’s decisions from the backdoor black box to publicly judge them, essentially a kind of “national referendum.” Deng Xiaoping wanted to ‘govern’ but feared being exposed. This irrational rule was precisely the root cause of the student movement’s persistence. Zhao Ziyang saw through this and leveraged the situation, turning the street protest into a “public opinion referendum,” which can only be described as a miracle.
What is the political basis behind Zhao’s strategy? His political ideals were pioneering, which was the main reason he dared to act. Zhao once admired ‘new authoritarianism,’ and he said Deng was the same. But when they faced strong political resistance, they had to seek alternative reform approaches. Deng had already agreed to ‘political reform’ at the 13th Party Congress two years before 1989, and Zhao then ordered Bao Tong to form the ‘Political Reform Office.’ This is a premise that cannot be ignored.
So, what resources does Zhao have to pressure Deng in reality? Deng and Zhao ‘working together in the same boat’ is the only remaining political foundation for reform. After Deng cut off his left arm Hu Yaobang, only Zhao Ziyang remains, and reform is already abandoned halfway.This is why Deng Jian rejected Deng Liqun and forced Zhao Ziyang to take over as General Secretary—he refused to lose to conservative elders like Chen Yun and Li Xiannian; Zhao Ziyang told Zong Fengming that Deng had already decided to hand over the Chairman of the Military Commission to him in the spring of 1989, which also shows that after deposing Hu, Deng relied heavily on Zhao, which was one point;
Before the 13th National Congress, Zhao Ziyang’s successes included dissolving Deng Liqun’s Secretariat Research Office, suspending the publication of Red Flag, and eliminating Deng Liqun in the marginal election. These were great encouragement to Zhao Ziyang’s political expectations, showing him that “the people’s will and the party’s will can be used.” At the same time, it also shows that in high-level strategic games, Zhao is more strategic and skilled than Hu, which is exactly what Deng needs. This is the second point. It can be said that on the eve of the ’89 scandal, Zhao Ziyang was full of ambition when he dared to throw the turmoil of Tiananmen Square to Li Peng and board his own car to Pyongyang.
Zhao Ziyang discusses the fall of Hu Yaobang and chronicles the politics of the elders. “The ones who truly have a say are the two elderly men (Deng and Chen). The third (Sennen) has influence but does not have a decisive effect.’ Deng Xiaoping silenced Chen Yun by saying he wouldn’t hold a standing committee, saying, “Two deaf men can’t hear, so what’s the point of holding a meeting!” Normally, Zhao Jiehu would face even tougher circumstances, but he managed to handle it with ease. “Chen wants a place to talk in meetings. Once, he blamed me for not having a meeting yet. I replied: I am just the Grand Secretary-General. Once you and Deng have agreed on it, we’ll open it. After hearing this, Chen said: Ah! The Grand Secretary-General alone!” —Zhao and Zong Fengming talked more vividly than his own recording.
the space where the Yang family “plays with fire.”
How much chance does Zhao Ziyang have to win? Zhao would never do something destined to fail. Facing conservative elders, Zhao’s backer was Deng Xiaoping. If he turned to challenge this backer, who would be his ally? Will there be an “alliance” to counterbalance Deng Xiaoping then?
Wanli, Qiao Shi, and Hu Qili were all once allies of Zhao, but after all, their influence carried little weight. Wanli was placed under house arrest at a critical moment, and the attempt to initiate the NPC Standing Committee’s attempt to veto martial law was easily resolved by Deng Xiaoping; Qiao Shi, however, only dared to remain neutral in the decision to impose martial law at the Deng residence. Another pivotal figure is Yang Shangkun. Undoubtedly, his role ultimately determines Zhao Ziyang’s success or failure, and strangely, ‘Recording Memories’ seems to be sparing of ink for this person. If Zhao and Yang both kept silent, the ‘alliance’ they once had would sink into the sea, but it could still be dragged down a bit.
Chen Yizi also recalled that Zhao Ziyang’s speeches at the May 3rd and 4th conferences commemorating the 70th anniversary of the May Fourth and the Asian banking conference received widespread acclaim. Especially after the Asian Development Bank speech, Yang Shangkun came over, patted Zhao on the shoulder, shook his hand tightly, and said, “Well spoken, I completely agree.” Then Qiao Shi shook hands with Zhao and said the same thing. At this time, most schools stopped their strikes, and the situation was improving.
However, even after years of efforts by Chen Yi-Tzu to moisten the Center for Rights, one never realized that ‘the turbulent undercurrents of political darkness in China are beyond the understanding of the kind-hearted people, and how could the conspiracies of vested interests to liquidate reform forces and democratic forces easily withdraw?’ On one hand, they incited students and intensified conflicts; on the other, they enraged Deng Xiaoping and attacked Zhao Ziyang.’
The boss of the “Yang Family Generals,” the chief steward of Zhongnanhai before the Cultural Revolution, became Deng’s liaison with Politburo Standing Committee members, holding a central position and familiar with Zhongnanhai’s inner workings. Wu Jiaxiang, who was familiar with the inside story of Zhongnanhai, called him a “big player,” which was very vivid. However, he said he feared losing the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and joined forces with conservatives to overthrow Zhao, which contradicts Zhao’s account. Zhao repeatedly mentioned in his book that Yang supported his moderate policies in handling student movements and opposed the crackdown, which seemed miscellaneous, and Xu Jiatun also confirmed this from the sidelines. However, Yang led Li Peng to Deng’s residence to seek an audience, which led to the ‘April 26’ editorial first; He was also entrusted by Zhao to try to persuade Deng to stay behind through Deng’s secretaries and children in a roundabout way. Only he knew who Yang Shangkun was betting on, but he was undoubtedly watching the situation and not making a wrong bet. He relied heavily on his younger brother, and since he was envied in the army, it wasn’t something that could be resolved by the conservatives or die-hard factions. He might as well consider that if he succeeded in supporting Zhao Ziyang, perhaps he would also become the ‘Retired Emperor’ for a time.
Zhao Ziyang left two interesting details: On the night of May 16 at the Deng residence, Yang Shangkun relayed Liao Hansheng’s advocacy for martial law, saying, “Shangkun has always opposed martial law.” After deciding to impose martial law, Zhao angrily resigned, saying, “Shang Kun repeatedly called to urge me to revoke the order.” Additionally, it is said that after the martial law troops were blocked from entering the city, Zhou Yibing, commander of the Beijing Military Region, could not find Yang Baibing, Yang Baibing could not find Yang Shangkun, and Yang Shangkun could not find Deng Xiaoping’s …….
After a bloody storm, Yang Shangkun finally betrayed Zhao Ziyang. But a few years later, this ‘enforcer’ told Chiang Yen-yong, a military doctor at 301 Hospital, that ‘the June Fourth Incident is the most serious mistake our Party has ever made, and now he is powerless to correct it.’ According to Wu Jiaxiang’s analysis, the 2001 whirlwind sweep of the ‘Tiananmen Secret Documents’ (also known as ‘The Truth About June 4th’) also has the background of the ‘Yang Family Generals,’ aiming to clear the name of the ‘massacre.’ This explanation is quite insightful. Yang Shangkun’s ‘President of the State’ crown was stained with Zhao Ziyang’s blood, and in the end, Deng Xiaoping took it from him. The ‘big players’ have always played with others, and in the end, they end up playing themselves.
Deng martial law lacks sufficient authority
The Yang brothers’ lack of authority in military discipline also reflected Deng Xiaoping’s lack of authority and further reflected the void of authority behind Mao Zedong. This political background is actually one of the causes of June Fourth and is rarely discussed. The desire for reorganization triggered by the power vacuum will tempt everyone in politics to believe that everyone is actually a ‘player.’ Zhao and Yang, who hold high positions and power, cannot remain outside. The delay in reform and the conservatives’ accountability, combined with public protests and interactions with public protests, led to a reshuffling of power structures, at first were not the outcome, only possibilities.
Chen Yun might be on par with Deng Xiaoping, and Ye Jianying had long lived in Lingnan but never returned north—he had Hua Guofeng’s assistance in capturing the “Gang of Four.” After Deng Xiaoping’s reappearance, in the early 1980s there was a great urgency to abolish China and the “Whatever Faction,” which displeased Marshal Ye. Deng sent Wang Zhen south to negotiate with him, and Ye recommended Yang Shangkun and Xi Zhongxun, then secretaries of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, to the Politburo to check Deng. Although Deng was the political commissar of the Second Field Army and a marshal, after the Forty-Nine Revolution, he had no involvement in military affairs. After his report, he asked Luo Ruiqing to take over as Secretary-General of the Military Commission. Deng Ji hoped to take command of the troops, but General Luo was injured by Lin Biao and left both legs crippled. He said, ‘How can I lead troops if I can’t stand up?’ He insisted on going to Germany for surgery, but at that time there was no diplomatic relations between China and Germany. Commanders Nie and Xu refused, so Luo insisted on going and died on the operating table. Deng lost his support for seven or eight years.
In 1979, a bizarre “Sino-Vietnamese Self-Defense Counterattack War” was fought with heavy casualties and no results, all said to be to seize military power for Deng. Ye Jianying was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease back in 1980. Over the past four years, his condition worsened, and he gradually fell out of favor. On National Day in 1984, Deng Xiaoping impulsively held a military parade, also for military authority,Just before National Day, Ye Shuai was about to resign. It is said that Deng ordered that no funeral could be held to coincide with National Day, so the doctors had to keep it up, so Ye Shuai remained in a vegetative state for another two years.
The palace intrigue before the Tiananmen massacre, involving the use of troops, made the situation increasingly unpredictable. Although Deng Xiaoping was a strongman, his authority was still lacking when it came to transferring troops to the capital under military control. The marshals and generals opposed it right away. What was especially unpredictable was that the Yang brothers commanded the suppression, held military power, and besieged the capital. Deng felt uneasy, and it was said the whole family was hiding. In late May and early June, China is in a power vacuum—how many days are there? Heaven knows. The most insecure side of this near-military coup trick is precisely the dictator himself.
guilty about that?
Zhao Ziyang’s brilliance after being deposed. The first refusal to review was to reject the temptation to retain Politburo members; The second time he refused to review and gave up his Central Committee membership, followed by sixteen years of house arrest—all of which set records in CCP history. Only two General Secretaries in Party history have refused to conduct self-criticism: Chen Duxiu and Zhao Ziyang.
However, after the publication of the books “Conversations Under Household” and “Recording Memories,” we learned that Zhao Ziyang would never admit fault to this party and repeatedly spoke of his apologies to Deng Xiaoping, repeatedly using words like “regret” and “regret” in his conversation with Mr. Ge. The two sides formed a sharp contrast.
This kind of guilt probably needs to be interpreted outside of politics. Zhao’s implication was probably this: You have shown me a favor for me, so why would I ‘intentionally harm you’? Major decisions can’t be discussed between us, so I resort to public opinion, thinking it will wake you up, but unexpectedly, it only angers you and leads to a great tragedy. Times have changed, and I truly feel sorry! Zhao Ziyang’s attitude reflects a certain lingering trace of the traditional “way of ruler and subject,” but it is also a valuable political ethic.
However, we should also recognize that Zhao Ziyang neither reflects nor reflects on himself; he feels guilty toward Deng but does not speak of regret toward history. Here, there is always a question of a politician’s ethical responsibility: whatever Zhao’s motives, under pre-modern conditions lacking at least basic political rationality, mobilizing the people intentionally or unintentionally to easily fight a dictator to the death is a futile sacrifice of innocent lives and a major reversal of history.
Li Shangyin wrote a reminiscing line in tribute to Zhuge Liang: ‘In future years, passing by the shrine in Jinli, Liangfu’s chant will leave regret abundant.’ This seven-character regulated verse, ‘Chou Bi Yi,’ is permeated throughout with the word ‘lingering regret,’ reflecting Zhao Ziyang, which is fitting; Zhuge Liang, when composing the ancient poem ‘Song of Liangfu,’ draws inspiration from the Spring and Autumn period when the Qi prime minister Yan Zi sends ‘two peaches kill three scholars.’ The meaning of whipping slanderers and harming the virtuous remains fresh to this day.
This article is reprinted from Su Xiaokang’s Facebook