Part One: Reflections on the 1989 Democracy Movement
Chapter 7: Starting Over
Political alliances often do not require some public or secret contract with others; they mainly depend on your independent political stance that is appropriately balanced.
— Excerpt from the article
1. ‘Start over.’
It is said that not long ago, due to financial difficulties, the Chinese authorities had to allow folk singer Cui Jian to hold concerts to raise funds for the Asian Games. Thus, a poster appeared on the streets of Beijing: the entire image was set against a blood-red background, with four large characters written on it: ‘Start Over’ (the title of a song by Cui Jian).
2. The dual dilemma of ‘memory’ and ‘forgetting.’
Numerous signs indicate that the Chinese authorities are making every effort to avoid mentioning June Fourth in public. The intention behind this is clear; as Jiang Zemin told American journalists, it is to use time to fade people’s memories of June 4th. In response to the CCP’s approach, the pro-democracy forces must confront it head-on, constantly reminding the world not to forget June 4th. Milan. Milan Kundera put it well: the history of humanity’s resistance against power is the history of memory resisting forgetting.
However, we cannot only see one side and ignore the other. After all, June Fourth is a double-edged sword; while it severely destroys the image of the CCP regime, it also severely deters the people from open resistance. If the CCP’s tactic of forgetting is used so successfully that for the vast majority of people, the June Fourth incident is as if it never happened. While it will certainly restore the CCP’s image, it will also help restore the people’s courage (think about the high morale of the Chinese people before June 4th). If today’s China fully reverts to the pre-June Fourth situation, it may not be good for authoritarian rule or bad for the democratic movement. Therefore, for authoritarian rulers, the best approach is to make the people forget the strong discontent stirred by June Fourth while also remembering the profound fear caused by the incident. Conversely, pro-democracy forces should strive to maintain people’s resistance against CCP authoritarianism while overcoming their own fears and helplessness. Obviously, achieving their respective goals is very difficult for both sides.
The above difficulties indicate that simply proposing ‘Never forget June 4th’ is still far from enough. Because when we try to strengthen people’s memory of June Fourth, we don’t do it well, and we are actually strengthening the deterrent effect of June Fourth. Unfortunately, so far, very few people have realized this particular difficulty.
3. Remember what should be remembered, forget what should be forgotten
That is one of the main purposes for writing this book. In the above chapters, I have tried to prove the following points:
l. Non-violent resistance is practical for the CCP authoritarian regime:
2. This struggle is likely to succeed, starting with limited success. Accumulate small victories into big victories, and ultimately achieve complete success:
3. The failures of past struggles were by no means objective or inevitable; they were also caused by our own mistakes, and these errors were certainly not impossible to correct.
If people recognize these points, they will overcome fear, rebuild confidence, and join the new democratic movement with greater determination, caution, courage, and cleverness. And that already shaken authoritarian regime will inevitably suffer defeat under the impact of new democratic movements. Only by recognizing the above points can we truly ‘remember what should be remembered, forget what should be forgotten.’ (In my article ‘On Freedom of Speech,’ I mentioned that we need this correct ‘memory—forgetting.’) ）
4. Refute several incorrect or impractical viewpoints
However, I must point out that within the pro-democracy movement, many friends are actively promoting a completely opposite set of views. For example:
1. Some say the outcome of the 1989 pro-democracy movement has already proven that opposing CCP authoritarianism through nonviolent means is ‘not a viable path.’ Undoubtedly, those who hold this view hope that people will discard the ‘illusion’ of nonviolent struggle and instead engage in violent resistance. But as I said in the previous chapter, the actual effect of this view—if people unfortunately truly believe it—can only be that the masses give up resistance and fall into passive inaction.
2. Some say that because the enemy is strong and we are weak, the failure of the 1989 pro-democracy movement was inevitable. Inevitable.
Arebuttal to this view is mainly found in Chapter 3. If the enemy is strong and we are weak, defeat is inevitable, then there can be no precedent for a new power winning an initial battle in the world. That is obviously absurd. It should also be clarified that the above viewpoint is, first and foremost, a sign of mental laziness and irresponsible pandering. Isn’t that so? Claiming that something that has already happened so and how is destined to happen only this way saves effort by avoiding detailed analysis of other real-world possibilities in the process. Some people prefer to adopt deterministic or fatalistic perspectives when explaining historical events after the fact that they are simply lazy to think deeply. Furthermore, if you say the movement’s failure is also related to our own mistakes, then it’s inevitable to criticize certain figures within the movement. Therefore, it is always something that offends people, and it is far better to leave everything to fate and bring everyone joy.
The key is, if people truly believe that, given the current situation of a strong enemy and a weak one, the failure of the democracy movement is objectively inevitable, then who would still participate in the democratic movement? An undeniable psychological fact is: most people, when they engage in a sport, always hold a strong belief in success; otherwise, they would rather avoid and endure. Therefore, the worst effect of promoting ‘the failure of the pro-democracy movement is inevitable’ is this. It will seriously, perhaps even fundamentally, undermine people’s confidence in joining the next democracy movement.
3. I have thoroughly argued that the 1989 pro-democracy movement once achieved great success, but unfortunately, it failed to stop while the opportunity arose, resulting in a failed attempt and a turnaround into defeat. As far as I know, many people agree with this analysis. However, some people also expressed opposition. Dissenting opinions can be divided into three categories. One group of objectors argues that the strategy principle of ‘take profits when good and go on bad sides’ is nonsense and equate it with stock speculation. As I have pointed out in Chapter 4, any strategic principle must be abstract, but you should not deny its meaning just because you are abstract. ‘Stop when you see good and act when you see something bad’ is actually a concise summary of the prisoner’s dilemma wrapped in game theory in modern political science. It involves the interaction between two free wills with different interests and lack mutual trust, so it cannot be simply compared to the situation of buying and selling stocks, where a free will faces blind market fluctuations. ‘Seeing things well’ doesn’t mean ‘seeing the best,’ and establishing positive interactions doesn’t mean speculation, and so on. The second category of opposing views acknowledges the correctness of the ‘quit while ahead’ principle but insists that there was never a moment during the 1989 democracy movement that could be called ‘good.’ Sections 6 and 7 of Chapter 4 of this book have already been thoroughly argued and will not be repeated here. Here, I want to emphasize the third category of opposing views. Some accuse me of failing to ‘quit while ahead’ in the 1989 pro-democracy movement, calling it ‘detached from the reality of the square,’ a kind of ‘scholarly’ ‘obvious’ and ‘idealized,’ unable to distinguish between ‘ought to be’ and ‘actual.’ They insist that self-control of a mass movement is simply impossible, and some have even solemnly declared that in the next pro-democracy movement, this uncontrollable nature will remain unavoidable. Finally, these friends criticized my views as merely shutting myself away in a study, indulging in wordplay, and taught me to have some practical experience in China’s democracy movement.
As everyone knows, whether writing or giving lectures, I never put on a ‘senior’ attitude: ‘Because my actual experience participating in the democracy movement is richer than yours, you should listen to me.’ ‘I know well that qualification is not an argument.’ Once you bring up some title of ‘qualification’ to try to strengthen the other person’s willingness to accept your viewpoint, it usually indicates that you lack sufficient confidence in the persuasiveness of the theories and factual materials you can use. However, when I see people whose practical experience is far inferior to mine criticizing me for not understanding reality, I can’t help but respond with a kind of ridiculous response. Of course, that’s off-topic.
Regarding the third objection, I can respond from the following aspects.
First, the 1989 pro-democracy movement was by no means a simple outburst of dissatisfaction. A mass movement involving a million participants, without unified organization and command, lasting fifty days, yet no incidents of smashing, looting, or arson occurred—an extremely rare occurrence in the entire history of nonviolent protest. Denying the broad consensus and self-restraint among participants, and calling it merely an emotional outlet, is clearly highly unfair. Generally speaking, it is extremely difficult to prevent a mass movement of this scale from occurring in localized violence. It is easier to ensure that the main team of the movement can advance and retreat. The 1989 pro-democracy movement achieved difficulty rather than ease, indicating that it was not the nature of mass movements that prevented it from advancing or retreating, but rather that the masses lacked the necessary ideological foundation in advance.
Second, in the square, those advocating quitting while ahead failed to gain the upper hand, not only because the majority of participants lacked prior consensus on positive interactions, but also because these moderate pro-democracy leaders lacked sufficient firmness in implementing their positions
Strictly speaking, in mass movements, the more radical the position, the more likely one is to prevail: more precisely, the more determined the attitude, the more likely it is to prevail. Whether the advocacy is radical is one thing; the firmness of the attitude is another. If you are very confident in your claim—which may itself be very mild—and if you are soberly aware that a decision at a critical moment often affects the lives and safety of thousands of people—including ourselves—and influences the course of history for years, even decades, then you should and must do your utmost to implement your claim. An unwavering iron will that has wise ideas but does not resolutely implement them is destined to fail in real political activities. This question is extremely important. Nowadays, many people worry that when major political turning points occur in mainland China in the future, can more mature and correct claims take the dominant position? Establishing requires us to engage in serious debates on various issues starting now in order to achieve the greatest possible consensus. Once the crisis occurs, we must firmly and forcefully carry out our positions. Tolerance simply means you must acknowledge and respect your opponent’s rights, never avoiding direct arguments. Those who know their positions are more correct but lack the tenacity to carry them through and fear getting involved in heated debates are not dignified, but politically weak and incompetent. I hope that everyone who takes China’s democratic cause seriously and earnestly will fully understand this.
Third, the claim that mass movements cannot achieve the necessary self-control is a major fallacy in the fact that it would strongly deny mass movements themselves. If we truly believe that, at this stage in mainland China, mass democratic movements are doomed to lack necessary self-control, then the only logical conclusion to be drawn is: from now on, we should no longer encourage, support, mobilize, or participate in this dangerous game. If we admit that we cannot control the fire in principle, then we should not play with fire, nor encourage anyone else to play with it.
Maybe. These friends might say, but mass movements always arise spontaneously!
No, that’s not right. Any large-scale mass democratic movement develops into a certain scale only after gaining broad and profound sympathy, praise, support, and participation from other social strata, not to mention that it often requires an encouraging social atmosphere at its inception. Otherwise, it would neither happen nor expand. When we say the 1989 pro-democracy movement was spontaneous, we are simply saying that this movement was not planned or coordinated by any individual or organization. But the so-called spontaneous ‘self’ includes all of us; it is our own wishes and actions that have created this movement.
Now, many believe that fighting for democracy through violent struggle is undesirable. The reason is that violent methods can result in greater social costs and can easily lead to negative consequences such as violence being met with violence. So these people clearly declared that they do not advocate violent struggle. For the same reason, shouldn’t those who assert that mass movements cannot be self-controlled, when seriously considering that runaway mass movements can easily lead to serious negative consequences, also clearly declare that they do not advocate for mass movements?
Here, I raised a very sharp question: Should we still carry out mass democratic movements? This issue is not as uncontroversial as it appears at first glance. 4. After January 15, tens of thousands of university students took to the streets in Beijing. At that time, many people in Beijing, including some intellectuals, initially reacted cautiously and with mixed feelings. What makes them happy is that this generation of college students cares about national affairs, pursues democracy, and bravely fights. The worry is that street movements often fail to act reasonably and with moderation, resulting in insufficient success and ruin. However, the impressive strategic skills and self-restraint displayed by the university student group later gave everyone tremendous encouragement and confidence. (In fact, college students themselves are aware of the tendency for mass movements to spiral out of control, so for a long time, they were reluctant to involve people from other social strata.) ) What I repeatedly emphasize is that it is not because of strong leaders and organizations, but based on universal consensus, the 1989 pro-democracy movement once excellently achieved necessary self-control. Unfortunately, later on, due to strategic differences (over the issue of ‘withdraw’ versus ‘stay’), the consensus that coordinated millions of people disappeared, and the square grew increasingly chaotic and out of control. Liu Xiaobo and the other three made a hunger strike declaration for the first time publicly criticizing the loss of control of the student movement, attempting to recoordinate the already chaotic movement, but ultimately failed.
5. Do we still want to run mass movements?
The June Fourth massacre has caused two negative consequences that are not easy to ignore. First, it undermines people’s confidence in nonviolent resistance (which I discussed in the previous chapter); second, it shakes people’s confidence in large-scale mass democratic movements, or street movements themselves. Many people feel that the two large-scale democratic movements—the 1986 student movement and the 1989 democracy movement—ended in failure, especially the 1989 movement, which suffered heavy losses and a major setback in domestic politics. In light of this, should we continue mass movements in the future? This issue is extremely important. If people have lost faith in mass movements themselves, how can you still expect a new wave of democracy movements to arrive?
6. Further discussion on the successes and failures of the 1989 pro-democracy movement
This also involves evaluating whether the 1989 pro-democracy movement succeeded or failed. I started with a detailed argument. However, there were still objections. Some say that because the slogans in the 1989 movement were so numerous that there was no unified purpose, you can’t test whether the consequences have reached their original intention. These people believe that my so-called goal of ‘fighting for freedom and rights and expanding autonomy’ is merely my own speculation, and does not exist in the realities of the movement.
This view is not worth refuting. Not to mention that during the 1989 pro-democracy movement, the goals of fighting for press freedom, press freedom, the establishment of independent organizations, and open equal dialogue with the government (what I refer to as ‘fighting for freedom and expanding autonomy’ is a summary of these demands) were originally very clear and focused. Even if we use a more general term, the 1989 pro-democracy movement was a democratic movement, and its purpose was certainly to oppose authoritarianism and promote democracy. Therefore, judging success or failure is simple: after the movement, society as a whole becomes more democratic or more authoritarian. By this standard, the outcome of the 1989 pro-democracy movement should be self-evident.
Indeed, a political event often leads to multifaceted consequences. Therefore, judging their success or failure is often not easy. For example, peasant uprisings throughout history have not achieved the ideals of establishing an equal society, but they often won certain concessions from the new ruling class. Another example was the Democracy Wall movement, where private publications were banned, but at the same time, official publications became more open, and personnel changes favored reformists at the top. Marx said that historically, such situations have occurred where, after counterrevolutionaries were suppressed, they turned to implement the demands put forward by some revolutionaries. This is called the Counter-Revolution Executing the Revolution’s Will. I have a different view on this judgment, so I will set that aside for now. But the situation of the 1989 pro-democracy movement was clearly not such a case. After June Fourth, mainland China’s regression was quite comprehensive; no one denies that after June Fourth, mainland China became more authoritarian rather than more democratic. Faced with such harsh facts, what’s the point of insisting it hasn’t failed? Yes, the 1989 pro-democracy movement helped raise the profile of overseas activists. However, I dare assert that the vast majority of overseas pro-democracy activists would rather give up such fame if the 1989 pro-democracy movement had a different ending.
7. Should it explain and elevate the pro-democracy movement, or cancel or deny it?
Clearly, the outcome of the 1989 pro-democracy movement was something most participants were very reluctant to see. It is precisely because of this unexpected and serious unintended consequences that many people have already raised serious doubts about whether to engage in similar movements in the future. In this situation, we must make it clear: the democratic movement can avoid losing control and thus achieve our intended goals. However, some friends loudly refute us, saying: No, hoping for mass movements to achieve self-control is completely detached from reality. In today’s mainland, where effective and unified political organizations are impossible, mass movements are destined to be like runaway horses and uncontrollable. I ask these friends to seriously consider: if everyone truly believes your views and sees the democratic movement as just a car without brakes, then facing the rugged and perilous road of opposing authoritarianism and fighting for democracy, who would still board the pro-democracy movement? Isn’t this viewpoint objectively helping to improve the democratic movement, or denying it?
8. Without proper reflection, there will be no next pro-democracy movement
Some critics expressed impatience with my lengthy article, saying, ‘Maybe, when the next pro-democracy movement erupts, you’ll still be endlessly reflecting on it.’ What I want to say is: without deep and correct reflection on the 1989 pro-democracy movement, the next pro-democracy movement will never come.
After all, humans are animals of experience; everyone’s behavior largely depends on past experiences—more precisely, (because experience needs interpretation) on people’s reflection on past experiences. If we refuse to deeply and correctly reflect on our experiences, we are essentially letting superficial and mistaken ideas dominate us. Why do some hardliners in the CCP say that 200,000 deaths will trade for 20 years of stability? They simply hope that people will superficially and mistakenly summarize their experiences, leading them into despair and pessimism. Some of the mistaken views listed above are often seen as summaries of the 1989 pro-democracy movement, but in reality, they fall completely into the conceptual traps set by authoritarians. In other words, authoritarians wish the people would believe that the failure of the democracy movement is inevitable and that its own missteps cannot be corrected, because once people believe these views, they will not rise up for a firmer, smarter struggle, and authoritarian rule itself can rest easy. In this sense, I must say that my critics have indeed made things worse for the pro-democracy movement.
Closing remarks
Remember, in politics, knowing the difficult is easier to do
Sun Yat-sen once proposed an important proposition: ‘Knowing what is difficult is easy.’ For a great practitioner and activist to emphasize the value of cognition so much is puzzling at first glance. In fact, that was precisely Sun Yat-sen’s brilliance. It is none other than those who care most about practice, are most skilled at action, and most truly appreciate the decisive significance of correct understanding for the great movement of Yichun’s success. After June Fourth, why did the people’s resistance activities in mainland China decrease so much? This is precisely because people’s perceptions have generally malfunctioned. In the face of brutal repression, the lessons most people immediately learn are usually passive. Meanwhile, certain popular views (for example, the idea that nonviolent struggle is ‘dead,’ that mass movements cannot be self-controlled, etc.), though radical, objectively reinforce those widespread negative consequences. In this situation, I must strongly emphasize the significant practical significance of summarizing the lessons from the 1989 pro-democracy movement from a positive perspective. Because it is the foundation and prerequisite for the relaunch of the pro-democracy movement.
Marchto October 1990
Reflections on the Chinese Democracy Movement (Oxford University Press, 1992).
Hu Ping’s website